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POLICE BRUTALITY WHEN THE PROSECUTOR DECLINES
TO PROSECUTE
PETER L. DAVIs*
This Article begins with the premise that, despite political rhetoric
and occasional prosecutions to the contrary, police brutality has been
effectively decriminalized in this country. The Article adopts the
Rodney King case as the paradigm for examining this phenomenon.
Scrutinizing the culture and semantics of police brutality, the author
concludes that a double standard of criminality exists in the United
States, under which different rules apply to police than to everyone
else. This double standard is socially dysfunctional. Particularly
among minorities, it leads to a sense of cynicism about our legal
system that can result in civil disorder when properly fueled. More
importantly, this double standard is morally wrong.
Because existing measures, including civil suits and civilian
review boards, have failed to deter police misconduct, the author
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Swartz, Thomas Ventura, Jeffrey Yablon, and Peter Zablotsky. This Article is dedicated to
Andra and Conner; to Gerard Papa, Richard Simonsen, and the thousands of victims of
police brutality; to Weldon Brewer, Art Cohen, and the legions of whistleblowers.
We prefer to avert our eyes from those who persist in reminding us of the
wrongs they have suffered-the mother whose child disappeared three years ago
on a New York street and who, instead of mourning in silence, continues to
appear on television and appeal for information about her missing son; the
young Sicilian woman who, instead of marrying her rapist as ancient local custom
dictates, scandalizes the town by bringing criminal charges; the concentration-
camp survivors who, instead of putting the past behind them, persist in pointing
their fingers at ex-Nazis living comfortable lives on quiet streets. Such people are
disturbers of the peace; we wish they would take their memories away to a
church, a cemetery, a psychotherapist's office ....
SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE 1-2 (1983). This Article is dedicated to these disturbers of
the peace-and to their lawyers-who, the author hopes, will find it useful.
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suggests that only the realistic threat of criminal prosecution will
actually deter police violence. Unfortunately, the close working
relationship between the police and prosecutors continues to make it
extremely unlikely that many prosecutors will ever mount a credible
challenge to systemic police brutality. Although, at first glance,
traditional judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion may appear
to preclude other avenues for undertaking criminal prosecution of
officers who engage in police brutality, the author suggests there is
another approach-citizen access to the grand jury-that could help
correct the current imbalance. This Article examines the avenues
available under current law by which victimized citizens may bring
their cases before the grand jury, either directly or through the
impaneling judge, even when such action is opposed by the public
prosecutor.' The author concludes that the only reason that citizens
have pursued this option so infrequently is that neither the bar nor
the general public is aware of it. Thus, the goal of the Article is to
analyze the pertinent law and provide practicing attorneys-and
their clients-with information on procedures for gaining access to
the grand jury in their jurisdictions.2
1. The legal strategies suggested in this Article are applicable to any violation of state
law. It is these particularly sensitive cases-those involving police criminality or other
forms of governmental misconduct-which the author wishes to emphasize. Significantly,
in the midst of the movement for victims' rights, the right of victims most ignored is the
right to commence a criminal prosecution. For instance, the ABA GUIDELINES FOR FAIR
TREATMENT OF CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1983)
appears to assume prosecution, and the key issue of what to do when the district attorney
refuses to prosecute is completely ignored.
2. Normally, the limited biographical information about the author of a law review
article supplied in note *, supra, would suffice; but in this case, greater disclosure seems
indicated. The author was a criminal trial attorney for the Legal Aid Society of New York
from 1972 to 1980. In 1987, he was appointed Special Counsel to the Public Safety
Committee of the Suffolk County, New York, Legislature, for the purpose of investigating
law enforcement-both the Police Department and the District Attorney's office-in
Suffolk County. In the past two decades, the last decade as a law teacher, the author has
also been co-counsel in the trial of a federal civil rights action arising from an incident of
police brutality and has dealt repeatedly with the Civilian Complaint Review Board of the
New York Police Department. Also during this time, he has advised many victims of police
brutality and personally witnessed incidents of such brutality himself. In addition, he has
written previously on the topic of possible remedies for victims of police brutality. See
Peter L. Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" to a Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed Model Statute
for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 329 (1989).
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I. RODNEY KING AND THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF POLICE
BRUTALITY
They give me a stick they give a mee [sic] a gun they pay me
50Gs to have some fun ....
-unidentified Los Angeles police officer3
There are no accurate, national statistics on the number of police
assaults on civilians.4 However, a Gannett News Service study of one
hundred police brutality lawsuits nationwide found "that taxpayers are
punished more than the officers responsible for the violence. The
100 cases, involving police departments that lost lawsuits and had to
pay victims at least $100,000, cost the nation's taxpayers nearly $92
million. But of 105 officers involved, only five were fired-and 19
were promoted."5 The Christopher Commission concluded that
"l[p] olice violence is not a local problem";' and shortly after the King
episode the heads of police departments from ten major cities around
the country "called for a national commission on crime and violence
3. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 52 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT] (verbatim
transmission from a Los Angeles Police Department mobile digital terminal).
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Individual Rights: Policing the Police, TRIAL, Dec. 1991,
at 32. As for actual statistics, John Dunne, then head of the Justice Department's civil
rights division, admitted that the Department had done a recent study of police brutality
nationwide based on "regrettably unreliable statistics." David Johnston, Aide Termed Easy
on Police and Unbudgingon Rioters, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at A18. Dunne conceded that
the statistics were incomplete because they included complaints made to federal authorities
only. Id. Curiously, Dunne "disclosed that the Administration opposes legislation
requiring the Justice Department to collect statistical data on the misconduct of officers
from local police departments, saying he feared such a measure would have a 'chilling
effect' on the department's efforts to improve the local police agencies." Id.
5. Rochelle Sharpe, Policing Brutality: How Cops Beat the Rap, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE,
at 1 (photo. reprint) (1992) [hereinafter GANNETr REPORT]. Gannett claims that its report
is "believed to be the first nationwide study of police discipline and brutality. . . ." Id. at
2. Gannett began by obtaining a list of civil police brutality suits, limiting that list to cases
since 1985 in which the police were required to pay $100,000 or more. One hundred
cases from twenty-two states, amounting to almost $92 million in awards, were included in
the database. Id.
The database yielded some interesting results: for instance, of two police officers-a
corporal and a sergeant-who cost a North Carolina town $220,000 in such a lawsuit, the
sergeant was subsequently promoted to captain and the corporal became chief of police
in another North Carolina town. Id.
After the Albuquerque Police Department lost $332,500 in a civil suit involving Officer
Jeff House, the department still made him "Officer of the Month." The jury concluded
House had shot and killedJohnny Lopez, a burglary suspect, although the district attorney
and the department's internal affairs division cleared him of all wrongdoing. Id. at 3.
6. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at i.
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to track instances of police brutality, stating that the problem of
excessive force is real and is linked to drugs, strife, and urban
decay."7 And Hubert Williams, formerly Chief of Police of Newark,
NewJersey, now President of the Police Foundation, said: "Police use
of excessive force is a significant problem in this country, particularly
in our inner cities."8
This Article begins with the premise that police brutality-par-
ticularly, but not exclusively, against minorities'-is de facto decrimi-
nalized in the United States1" and has been so for many years. The
Article argues that decriminalization has occurred for many reasons,
including the influential role of the police in an organized society, the
desensitization of the public and the judicial system to the realities of
police criminal behavior, the symbiotic relationship of prosecutors
and the police, the growth of the legal doctrine of prosecutorial
discretion and the corresponding decline of private prosecutions, and
the waning independence of the grand jury. One need not look far
to find cases illustrating these concepts. Without question, the most
well-known police brutality case in recent years was the videotaped
beating of Rodney King.1 The Christopher Commission found that
while Rodney King was lying on the ground, Sergeant Koon of the
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) twice fired a Taser electric
stun gun at him. 2 As George Holliday's videotape shows in horrify-
ing detail, three uniformed LAPD officers then clubbed King fifty-six
times with their batons and kicked him six times in the head and
7. Id. at 25.
8. Id. at i.
9. Cf Russ W. Baker, Thugs in Blue: New York's Finest Serve and Protect Themselves, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 29, 1992, at 29 ("Police brutality: It's not just for minorities
anymore."). In fact, in two of the more significant cases of police brutality with which the
author has been personally involved, the victims were white. Thus, although race assuredly
plays a major role in police violence, to view police brutality simply as a function of racism
is to misunderstand-and oversimplify-the problem.
10. De facto decriminalization occurs when an act, though still deemed criminal by the
legislature or common law, no longer results in sanction because the criminal justice
system simply refuses to punish violations of the law-at least under certain circumstances.
De facto decriminalization does not require the abandonment of all prosecution under the
law. If only a very small percentage of the known violators is prosecuted (or convicted),
however, at some point the sanction associated with the crime becomes so remote that the
crime is effectively or functionally decriminalized. Hence, if one million acts of police
brutality occur each year, but only a dozen brutal cops are convicted, de facto decriminal-
ization of police brutality has occurred.
11. "[T]he videotape of Rodney King being beaten by officers of the Los Angeles
Police Department last year made police brutality real for white suburbanites-and,
indeed, for all Americans who might have doubted the phenomenon's existence."
Comment: Tales of the Tapes, THE NEw YORKER, Oct. 12, 1992, at 4.
12. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
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body.'3  One reason why the King case makes such a compelling
example is that many Americans expected the police officers involved
in the beating of Rodney King to be swiftly charged, convicted, and
punished. One African-American author used the following words to
describe the period immediately after the assault upon King: "I, like
millions of others, watched the tape over and over, feeling more
enraged each time. 'They'll go to jail,' is what my friends and I kept
saying. 'It's an open-and-shut-case. It's in living color.""' 4 Instead,
the officers were acquitted in state court.'5 Following the subse-
quent riots in Los Angeles, President Bush ordered the Justice
Department to undertake its own criminal investigation. The Justice
Department immediately convened a federal grand jury, which then
reindicted the four police officers on charges of criminal civil rights
violations. In April 1993, nearly two years after the original beating
and one year after the officers' acquittal on the state criminal charges,
a federal jury convicted Sergeant Koon and Officer Powell of civil
rights violations and acquitted the remaining two officers.'6
The King case received so much publicity because a private
citizen, George Holliday, captured on videotape the brutal beating of
Rodney King early in the morning of March 3, 1991, by California law
enforcement officers. This tape was televised and retelevised with
mind-numbing frequency across the nation. Because of this publicity,
when the state criminal trial of the four police officers who participat-
ed in the beating resulted in the virtual acquittal of the officers, the
verdict triggered rioting in Los Angeles, scenes of which also were
televised repeatedly throughout the country. Viewed together, these
events present a fascinating cause-and-effect illustration of the social
dysfunction that results from the breakdown of public confidence in
the criminal justice system.' 7
13. Id. at 3, 7.
14. Terry McMillan, This Is America, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A35.
15. Three of the four officers were acquitted on all charges; the fourth officer was
acquitted on all charges but one. On the final count, an assault charge, the jury was
unable to reach a verdict. Robert Reinhold, U.S. Jury Indicts 4 Police Officers in King Beating,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al, B8. The trial judge later dismissed this remaining charge.
State Charge Dismissed Against Powell DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 29, 1993, at 6a.
16. Verdict in LA: King Case Chronology, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 18, 1993, at A19.
17. The King case represents the exceptional situation in which the public could view
and form its own judgment on the evidence that was presented at trial. "'Unlike most
trials, a lot of people have not only seen the event itself but have seen it again and again
and again . . . .'" Seth Mydans, Officers' Assault Trial Nears Opening, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1992, at B8 (quoting Toni M. Massaro of the University of Arizona College of Law).
Rarely has the public had a better chance to view an event with the camera's eye and then
to compare it to the outcome of the corresponding trial. Several in-depth factual
[VOL. 53:271
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Following the Los Angeles riots, the independent Christopher
Commission was appointed to study the King matter. The Commis-
sion investigated both the causes and the extent of police brutality in
the LAPD and found that there was a culture of police brutality in the
Department that extended well beyond the acts of the four indicted
police officers. 8 Several facts, including the nonintervention and
passive complicity of the other police officers on the scene, convinc-
ingly refuted theories that the four officers were just "bad apples." 9
In fact, the demographics of the LAPD officers on the scene during
the incident indicated that this was not a homogeneous or nonrepre-
sentative group of officers." Neither the age, experience, gender,
or race of the police officers involved seemed to be a key factor;2' if
color was an issue, it was the color blue that mattered most. Instead,
the facts of the King case suggested that the beating was not an
isolated event within the LAPD and that the officers were not
seriously concerned about being brought up on disciplinary or
criminal charges.2 2  Even after the King beating, several LAPD
officers who were questioned shared the view that administering such
a beating was not inappropriate.23
investigations also were available to the public, the best-known of which was the
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. See also infra notes 18, 24-29 and
accompanying text.
18. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 31, 97 (discussing how the
style of law enforcement practiced in the LAPD, combined with inadequate supervision of
abusive officers, contributed to police brutality).
19. Only one of the twenty-three LAPD officers present at the beating of Rodney King
made any attempt to intervene. Id. at 7, 11. Ironically, four of the LAPD officers who
stood by and watched were field training officers, to whom was entrusted the training of
impressionable probationary officers during their first year of police work after graduation
from the Police Academy. Id. at 11, 12.
20.
The ages of these 23 LAPD officers ranged from 23 to 48. Their experience
varied from 10 days to 29 years since graduation from the Police Academy. In
the group were one African-American male, one African-American female, four
Latino males, two white females, and 15 white males.
Id. at 11.
21. For an excellent discussion on the causal role of racism in the King case, see
Deborah W. Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DEN. U. L. REv. 237 (1993). "A fear
of black men still dwells in the collective unconscious of America. The verdict in the
Rodney King case legitimized that fear." Id. at 248. Still, it is significant that even the
black officers were at least passively complicit in the beating. This complicity may indicate
that the subculture of police brutality exerts even greater influence than racial affinity.
22. At the hospital where King was first taken, the nurses reported that the police
officers "openly joked and bragged about the number of times King had been hit."
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
23. The fact that some kind of attitude problem existed among the officers of the
LAPD-whether toward the public in general or toward ethnic minorities in particu-
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Further manifestations of this attitude problem appeared when
the Christopher Commission analyzed computer tapes of messages
transmitted among police officers on duty. In Los Angeles, police
cars and headquarters are linked by a sophisticated communications
network of on-board computer terminals called Mobile Digital
Terminals (MDTs). An officer can type a message to any other officer
on the keyboard of the MDT in his patrol car. Incoming messages
are displayed on the MDT computer screen.24 The Commission
found "brazen and extensive references to beatings and other
excessive use of force in the MDTs."25 In fact,
That officers would feel free to type such messages ... into
the Department's official computer communications chan-
nel, knowing that the communications were subject to
monitoring, is, in the Commission's view, evidence of a
serious problem with respect to excessive force in the LAPD.
The apparent confidence of these officers that nothing
would be done about their inflammatory statements suggests
lar-was demonstrated by the results of a poll taken by the Police Department two months
after the King beating: 4.9% of the officers surveyed agreed with the statement that "an
officer is justified in administering physical punishment to a suspect who has committed
a heinous crime," id. at 34, and 4.6% said that it was appropriate to administer physical
punishment to "a suspect with a bad or uncooperative attitude." Id. Although 84% of the
officers surveyed disagreed with these statements, another 11% took no position. Id. The
Christopher Commission concluded:
That nearly 5% of LAPD officers would acknowledge in a written survey
sponsored by the Department that an officer would be entitled to use 'street
justice" against suspects with a "bad or uncooperative attitude," and that 11%
would have "no opinion," are evidence of a serious problem in attitude toward
use of force among a significant group of LAPD officers.
Id,
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id. at iii. For a sampling of these conversations, see id. at 49-54. One of the more
'subtle" conversations uncovered by the Christopher Commission included the following:
"We prond (sic) him straight out of his jaguar .
"He is crying like a baby."
"Did U educate him."
"Take 1 handcuff off and slap him around."
"He is crying to (sic) hard and there is 4 detectives here." "Well, dont (sic)
seatbelt him in and slam on the brakes a couple times on the way to the
sta[tionhouse] ..
Id. at 49-50.
The MDT transmissions also indicated that a number of officers sought out and
enjoyed pursuits of fleeing suspects and shooting incidents. Id at xi. The transmissions
disclosed a recurrent theme of racial epithets, often comparing members of different
ethnic groups to different animals. Id. at xii.
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a tolerance within the LAPD of attitudes condoning violence
against the public.26
The Christopher Commission concluded further that the civilian
complaint system, created to detect and punish police officers' use of
excessive force, was "skewed against complainants."2 7 For example,
Rodney King's brother had attempted to make such a complaint
against the LAPD, but his efforts were frustrated.2" Absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, the reviewing panel generally would not "sustain"
an uncorroborated civilian complaint if it conflicted with police
officers' accounts. Thus, the Commission found that in the King case,
[e]ven if there had been an investigation, [the Commis-
sion's] case-by-case review of the handling of over 700
complaints indicate [d] that without the Holliday videotape
the complaint might have been adjudged to be "not sus-
tained," because the officers' version conflicted with the
account by King and his two passengers, who typically would
have been viewed as not "independent." '
Los Angeles has no monopoly on ineffective civilian complaint
systems.3 ° One report observed that nationwide police internal
investigations so routinely exonerated the officers scrutinized that
"critics joke the investigators have whitewash under their finger-
nails."3" For example, in the case of one officer who received forty-
26. Id. at 54-55. Although it is not mentioned by the Commission, these were not
situations in which police officers, pumped up with adrenaline, shouted inane and racist
epithets in the heat of a chase. The LAPD's MDT system requires that an officer-
probably not well-trained as a typist-take the time to type what he wants to say. These
messages, then-as opposed to shouts over a police radio-are not entirely spontaneous;
they are premeditated. The aspect of premeditation and lack of any sense of need for self-
censorship is a reflection of the depth of the problem.
27. Id. at xix, 153.
28. Id at ii.
29. Id. The Christopher Commission noted that only 42 of 2152 civilian complaints
of abuse were sustained by the Department. Id. at 153.
30. See GANNETr REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that although "in Los Angeles,
police discipline is about as rare as a smog-free day," other cities show similar laxity toward
police offenders). "A commission in Boston ... declared the police internal affairs
process was 'unfairly skewed against Boston's citizens.' The panel studied 136 brutality
complaints filed in 1989-90, finding only eight were upheld by the department." Id.
31. Id, at 4. Frequently, police review boards do not even take the time and trouble
to collect all the evidence. Id. at 5.
Indeed, many internal affairs officers don't even bother to interview witnesses.
When the Christopher Commission investigated brutality in Los Angeles last year
after the Rodney King beating, it found cases where officers made no attempt to
identify citizens who witnessed abuse. A similar commission in Boston discovered
the department did not contact any witnesses in 79 percent of its abuse cases.
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four civilian complaints in less than four years, none of the com-
plaints were sustained by the police department's internal discipline
system.32 Amnesty International, an organization usually associated
with exposing police-state atrocities in Third World and totalitarian
countries, recently released a report detailing systematic torture of
civilians by the Chicago police department.
33
The advent of the camcorder has made the epidemic of police
brutality more visible nationwide. In Fort Worth, an officer was
dismissed after he was videotaped gratuitously striking a suspect
repeatedly with his baton. 34  A videotaped incident in Kansas City,
Missouri, led to a comprehensive plan to sensitize police officers,
particularly those with the most citizen complaints against them, so
that they would not continue to use excessive force. 5
These boards rarely even include the record or finding of civil or criminal trials.
Some lawyers for municipalities, who defend the police, admit that even they are troubled
by the quality of internal affairs investigations. Id.
In New York City, the Civilian Complaint Review Board has a reputation for
disciplining police officers that is remarkably unimpressive. For example, in one criminal
case tried by the author, two defendants without any prior records were charged with
assaulting a lone police officer. Both defendants testified it was the officer who assaulted
them, and their testimony was corroborated by two disinterested witnesses. The jury
returned with acquittals in less than an hour and demanded of the writer why the police
officer had not been disciplined. The author filed a complaint containing all the
pertinent information with the CCRB. Months later the CCRB found the charges
"unsubstantiated." When pressed as to what it had done to investigate the case, the CCRB
finally admitted that it had not even attempted to interview the acquitted defendants or
the independent witnesses or even to obtain the trial transcript; investigators merely spoke
with the officer involved and read the police reports he filled out about the incident. That
was the investigation that cleared this officer.
32. Id. at 4 (observing that "'[it's a system where the citizens virtually cannot win'"
(quoting Harvey Grossman, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union in
Illinois)).
33. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
TORTURE IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS (1990).
34. Officer Dismissed in Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at A22.
35. Don Terry, Kansas City Police Go After Own "Bad Boys, "N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991,
at Al, D19. It is difficult to be optimistic about the results of this program, however.
Officer Jim Pott was one of the first to graduate from the program; afterwards, he told a
reporter:
Sometimes I get carried away with the macho image; a lot of us do .... I
consider myself an aggressive officer; you have to be. I like messing with the real
bad guys. Not too long ago, the unwritten rule was if somebody ran on you and
you caught 'em, you'd smack 'em one. To be honest,. in the past we got away
with quite a bit. But everything is post-L.A. now.
Id. Pott was talking with a reporter while on patrol, explaining that, in retrospect, he was
glad he had been part of the program: "The dispatcher's voice broke in: 'Man with a gun
in his shorts.' Flicking his cigarette out the window, Officer Pott made a U-turn. And
then, heading his cruiser toward the stranger with the gun, he smiled and said, 'I love this
job.'" Id. at D19.
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One reason why the police can engage in such outrageous
brutality without being held accountable is that the enormous power
wielded by police groups and unions is frequently directed toward
subverting attempts to reform the system. 6 On a fundamental level,
this power is fueled by the public's fear of crime. One ex-New York
City police officer has suggested that most citizens are pleased to
think that the violent urban underclass is afraid of the police." In
this view, the police behavior in the Rodney King case was not
aberrant; it was an "honest" manifestation of what the citizenry wants
its police force to do.3s Widespread fear of crime and criminals
translates into public backing of the police and their unions and
diminished scrutiny and criticism of their tactics. "[Police] know the
public will tolerate more force these days because of the war on
crime."39
In addition to widespread public support, police unions enjoy
remarkable political influence.4" Politicians compete fiercely for the
36. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 9, at 29-30 (detailing efforts of the New York city police
union, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, to prevent the formation of an all-civilian
review board). Individual police officers can also exert concerted pressure to discourage
disciplinary actions against perpetrators of brutality:
Last year, [the Kansas City police chief] handed out the stiffest suspension in
department history, 120 days without pay when an officer hit a Baptist minister
in the back of the head with the butt of a shotgun during a robbery investigation.
The officer's colleagues held a monthlong work slowdown to protest the
action and raised thousands of dollars for the officer by auctioning off the same
kind of shotgun he used to strike the minister.
Terry, supra note 35, at D19.
37. Ira Socol, Trained to Do Our Dirty Work for Us, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at 23
(observing that "in Los Angeles and other places, most citizens have been happy in the
knowledge that the urban enemy is afraid of the warriors in blue."). Thus, Socol argues,
to be surprised by police attitudes and misconduct is to be "ignorant of the American
public's relationship with its urban police forces":
Americans insist on "control" of street crime. Politicians at every level echo that
call, and no one really protests. Not the media, not civic leaders, not even the
American Civil Liberties Union.
Only when the collateral damage ends up on TV do we worry. Then our
conscience takes over, and we are stunned and shocked. Like Vietnam, we have




39. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
40. Of the New York City's Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, one reporter wrote:
The 20,000-member union is so dominant and so brazen it can hold the city
hostage if it sees fit, as it did last year when a PBA rally turned into a drunken
riot, with thousands of police officers storming the steps of City Hall and
blocking traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge.
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endorsements of law enforcement unions and, as a result, often are
loathe to criticize the police for brutality.4' When a powerful police
union charges that a politician is "soft on crime," that candidate's
chances for election or reelection can be dramatically reduced.4 2
Indeed, because of their political support and shrewdly negotiated
contracts, some police unions virtually run the police departments. 43
In many jurisdictions, police unions have successfully defeated or
delayed the establishment of civilian-operated review boards. 44  At
least some commentators feel that one of the best ways to deter police
brutality may be to diminish the power of police unions.45
Another factor contributing to this double standard is the wide-
spread failure of administrators to institute real sanctions against
perpetrators of police brutality. Even when an officer is tried
administratively and found guilty of abuse, his punishment ordinarily
is much lighter than the penalty that would be given to a civilian who
committed the same act. For example, Los Angeles police officers
who brutalized handcuffed suspects typically were suspended from
work for fewer than ten days.46 In New York City, "when officers are
Russ W. Baker, The Rogue Police Union, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 7, 1993, at 25, 26. The
Village Voice concluded that the PBA "has become an increasingly potent local political
force. . . one that operates above the law and without review." Id. at 27.
41. Questions of brutality often revolve around judgments of whether the amount of
force the police officer used was "excessive" or merely "necessary force." When the police
claim that only "necessary force to make the arrest" was used, it is the rare politician who
will voluntarily enter the fray and challenge that assessment. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 3; see also Baker, supra note 9, at 30 ("Virtually no politician or powerful
figure will publicly acknowledge what many privately maintain: that police brutality and
abuse in New York City are much more than a blip on an otherwise placid screen."). One
columnist referred to New York City's police union, the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association, as "the famously politically powerful PBA." Andy Logan, Who Guards the
Guards?, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1992, at 70.
43. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. The union contract is so strong in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, for example, that an officer who pleaded guilty to police brutality
not only remained on the force, but was promoted. See infra notes 48-49 and accompany-
ing text. See also Baker, supra note 40, at 26 ("[1]nside the New York Police Department,
little gets done without tacit PBA approval .... ."). Moreover, a review panel found that
the PBA actually obstructed efforts to eradicate corruption. Selwyn Raab, New York's Police
Allow Corruption, Mollen Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at Al (observing that "the
P.B.A. often acts as a shelter for officers who commit acts of misconduct.").
44. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 6; see also Baker, supra note 9, at 29. Ironically,
studies show that true civilian-run review boards are less harsh disciplinarians than police
chiefs; the civilians involved seem to develop greater sympathies for the police and to give
them every benefit of the doubt. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
45. See GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; see also Baker, supra note 40, at 25 (noting
that "[ploliticians kowtow to [the P.B.A.].").
46. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; see also GANNETT REPORT,
supra note 5, at 2 (noting that even when a police brutality victim wins a civil suit against
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found guilty of using excessive force, the penalty many receive is a
one-week suspension-the same punishment given to an officer who
accepts two free doughnuts from a restaurant, wears a turtleneck
while in uniform, or is discourteous to a supervisor."47 The ineffec-
tiveness of such sanctions at reforming brutal officers or removing
them from the force is illustrated by the case of Robert Christy, a
Bridgeport, Connecticut, police officer. Although Christy was indicted
for felonious assault on a civilian and plead guilty to a misdemeanor,
he returned to the force and subsequently was promoted to ser-
geant.48  After rejoining the department, Christy wrote on a police
test, "If it takes a whack with a blackjack to get thejob done, so be it."49
A. The Nature and Semantics of Police Brutality
Vital to an understanding of police brutality is a grasp of the
underlying culture that makes brutality not only permissible, but
inevitable. Police brutality is more than the occasional Rodney King
case and more than the periodic unprovoked killing of a minority
the officer or the department, it is rare for the officer to lose as much as one day of work,
much less his job).
47. David Kocieniewski & Leonard Levitt, Turning a Blind Eye to Misconduct: The NYPD,
Once a Model, Undermines Enforcement, NEWSDAY, Nov. 13, 1991, at 5. Furthermore, once an
officer has been charged before the Civilian Complaint Review Board, it is rare that he
also is criminally prosecuted. See, e.g., Craig Wolff, Police Sergeant Is Charged in Assault on
Brooklyn Civic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at BI (noting that the indictment of a
police officer who allegedly beat a community leader and her son was "one of the few
times that an officer [charged before the CCRB] has been indicted and arrested.").
48. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
49. Id.
In an incident in New York City, the author observed a police officer commit an
unprovoked assault in the lobby of the criminal courthouse and filed a complaint with the
CCRB, which found the complaint warranted and "determined that the appropriate action
in this case is to have the officer involved instructed by his Commanding Officer. The
specifics of [the] complaint will be discussed, and the officer will receive formal
instructions regarding his responsibility to conduct himself properly in his contacts with
the people we serve." A civilian could have gone to jail for a year for this incident.
The lack of seriousness with which the CCRB views this kind of incident is apparent
from the last paragraph of the executive director's letter announcing the decision in this
case: "The Police Commissioner and the members of the Board regret that your
experience with a member of the Police Department was less than satisfactory. I trust that
in the future our service will meet with your approval." This public relations sentiment
may be appropriate from the president of an airline when his employee misroutes or
temporarily loses your luggage; it is not appropriate when a police officer gratuitously
assaults another human being. (Less than three years later the officer involved was
indicted for "riding shotgun" during two cocaine sales. Police Officer Indicted in Queens Drug
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1981, at B5.) See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK &JAMESJ.
FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE ExCEsSIvE USE OF FORCE 217-36 (1993) (discussing
the development of civilian review boards and criticizing their effectiveness).
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youth by a police officer." These sensational cases are just the
proverbial tips of the iceberg. Any criminal lawyer who spends a
substantial amount of time in an urban criminal court knows that
examples of police officers slapping, pummeling, hitting, and beating
criminal defendants are routine, as "common as potholes."51
Ironically, focusing on the killings and the "media" cases minimizes
the problem; emphasizing the high-profile cases leads the public to
believe that police brutality occurs "only" once every few months.
Furthermore, emphasizing only the killings by police officers leads the
public to believe that acts of brutality are committed only by mentally
deranged police officers and that ordinary officers would never beat
or kill a suspect.52
In fact, ordinary police officers do commit police brutality, and
they do beat and kill criminal suspects. When a suspect dies, the
actual lifetaking may be virtually "incidental" from the point of view
of the intention of the police officer. An old maxim of criminal
lawyers may describe the reality best: murder is simple assault with
unfortunate consequences. As with criminals, when a police officer
intends to do harm-to kick, shove, or hit a suspect-that officer is
responsible for any injury, including death, that may result. The
effects of a beating cannot be limited with surgical precision.
For these reasons, it is not necessary that a cop be unusual, crazy,
or particularly racist in order to beat and kill a suspect. All that is
needed is a cop who decides to teach a backtalking suspect a lesson
in his own way. The emotions that cause such killing are present, to
a greater or lesser degree, in virtually every police officer; they are
shaped and perpetuated by forces and beliefs within police depart-
ments and society itself.5"
50. Baker, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing the killing ofJose Garcia in the Washington
Heights section of New York City).
51. Id. at 30.
52. This view ignores the essential nature of police work, however. Because of the
inherent danger of the job, police are frequently very tense. GANNETr REPORT, supra note
5, at 2. To make matters worse, a police officer's shift often involves long and uneventful
periods of patrol, which can be interrupted suddenly by a radio call or a street incident.
Id. Consequently, even "ordinary" officers can be forced to make a nearly instantaneous
leap from boredom to frenzied activity and to perform their duty intelligently on the basis
of incomplete information about the suspect and the situation. It is not surprising,
therefore, that some incidents of brutality may result from momentary bad judgment or
the adrenaline of the situation. See id. at 3. "[The police officer's job is] 95 percent
boredom and 5 percent mass hysteria," saidJohn Dineen, President of the Fraternal Order
of Police in Chicago. Id.
53. This view is consistent with the work of Haney and Zimbardo, who set up a
simulated prison using Stanford University students. Craig Haney & Philip G. Zimbardo,
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Hence, to focus on police officers who wrongfully kill prisoners,
to the exclusion of those officers who merely "rough them up,"
paradoxically, is to distort and minimize the nature of the police
brutality problem. The core problem is not those "simple assaults
with unfortunate consequences," but rather the constant, daily
battering by police officers of suspects, mostly African-American and
Latino.54 Any policy aimed at deterring police brutality must be
The Socialization into Criminality: On Becoming a Prisoner and a Guard, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND
THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 199 (June L. Tapp & Felice
J. Levine, eds., 1977).
(T]he single important lesson to emerge from recent social-psychological
research is the degree in which situations and not personalities control behavior.
After careful scrutiny, the dispositional bias has been largely invalidated. All of
us-laymen, psychologists, and judges-seem to have greatly overestimated the
extent to which traits or dispositions determine behavior.
Id.
Interestingly, in the Stanford study, the guards' behavior grew increasingly violent,
notwithstanding
the dramatic decrease of prisoner resistance. The exercise of power seemed to
become self-perpetuating; acts of aggression appeared to acquire inherently
rewarding properties and were no longer even quasi-rational responses to
situational threats.
Guards' prison reputations are based on demonstrations of masculinity, uses
of force, and past experience handling violent encounters. In the simulated
prison, the most respected guards were those most sadistic in their treatment of
prisoners and most forceful in responding to real or imagined affront. They
became the leaders on each shift, and their aggression was modeled by others
until their tough demeanor was adopted by nearly all.
Id. at 216. Drawing an analogy between prison guards and police officers, Haney and
Zimbardo quote Rubinstein:
Every policeman is faced at some point with the temptation to beat a prisoner.
There is always someone who angers him or arouses fear in him that he seeks to
eradicate by punishing the person who caused him to quiver. If his supervisors
do not object, nothing can stop him.
Id. (quoting JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 321 (1973)).
54. See generally Baker, supra note 9 (detailing examples of police brutality against
numerous ethnic victims, including Latinos, African-Americans, Jews, Poles, Italians, and
others). The results of such minor assaults may be as much psychological as they are
physical. A newspaper editor described a scene from his youth:
I remember seeing my best friend's uncle slapped by a white motorcycle cop after
being stopped for a supposed traffic violation. That incident stuck with me
because I had deep respect for the uncle, a polite gentleman, an insurance agent
and one of the few black professionals, other than teachers, in Montgomery[,
Alabama]. He was an important symbol, a role model to a black boy with
ambition.
Quite possibly, my friend's uncle didn't make as much of the slap as I did.
But after the incident, my friend and I simply looked at each other, speechless,
and we never said a word about iL My friend seemed as embarrassed and
frightened as I was.
Paul Delaney, About Men: My "Crazy" Grandfather, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992, Magazine, at
18.
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calculated not just to deter the killings-which are probably the least
predictable acts of brutality and hence the least susceptible to
deterrence-but rather the more frequently occurring, routine
battering of suspects by the police.
In addition to underestimating the nature and extent of the
problem, we as a society even fail to assign the proper nomenclature
to the police behavior in question. Using the term "police brutality"
serves to decriminalize the act: "brutality" is not a crime; the crimes
involved are assault and battery. The use of terms like "police
brutality," "police misconduct," and "excessive force" demonstrate our
conscious or unconscious judgment that assaults by police officers are
not really crimes.55 But assaults are crimes even when committed by
police officers, and therefore, the term we should be using to describe
such events is "police criminality."56 Just as we diminish the worth
of the victims of police brutality by decriminalizing it, we also set a
double standard for our police. As a result, the very people we have
chosen to serve as the guardians of law and order in our society are
held to a less stringent standard of behavior than are the rest of us.
Aside from its irrationality, this result is morally indefensible.
In light of the pervasiveness and intractability of the problem of
police brutality or criminality, perhaps it is not surprising that the
various avenues of legal recourse available to victims generally have
failed to deter such conduct. The following three subsections address
the questions of why threats of civil and criminal penalties do not
discourage police criminal behavior and why prosecutors can
monopolize the legal process to the extent that their discretion
dictates that few brutal police officers will ever face criminal charges.
55. This view comports with the view that many officers seem to hold regarding their
own conduct: that they, as police officers, are entitled to engage in behavior that would
be illegal if they were civilians. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 42, at 70 (describing a protest
by ten thousand off-duty New York City police officers at City Hall, in which "the level of
contempt and hatred that some members of the city's Police Department felt for Mayor
David Dinkins had reached such a pitch that they felt they had every right to engage in
behavior that, had they not been cops, the Police Department would surely have labelled
a riot"). See al/oJoseph P. Armao & Leslie U. Cornfeld, Why Good Cops Turn Rotten, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at A19 (citing the Mollen commission, a body charged with
investigating police corruption in New York, as finding that corruption can take the form
of brutality: "Today's corruption is characterized by brutality, theft, abuse of authority and
active police criminality.").
56. For this insight, the author is indebted to Mr. Gerard Papa, an attorney who
himself has been a victim of police assault.
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B. Why Civil Remedies Fail to Deter
Civil rights actions and other civil suits may well discourage police
brutality to some extent, but the present pandemic of police
criminality indicates that more is needed to deter such behavior.
There are several obvious problems with the civil approach. First, in
order to collect damages in a civil suit, the victim must be at least
minimally attractive to the jury. A petty criminal, the most common
victim of police beatings, rarely will succeed in a civil suit because
petty criminals generally make unappealing plaintiffs. Furthermore,
civil cases can drag on for years, and few victim-plaintiffs have either
the resources or the perseverance to endure lengthy litigation.
Therefore, because the plaintiff must be both attractive to a jury and
willing and able to endure long court delays, the most successful civil
plaintiffs will be from the middle class-a group that rarely experienc-
es police brutality-not from the lower classes, which face brutality
almost every day. Moreover, there are simply too few lawyers willing
to litigate civil suits and federal civil rights actions arising from
incidents of police brutality. Personal injury lawyers find most of
these cases insufficiently remunerative, and there are not enough
"public interest" lawyers to handle this volume of litigation.
Additionally, civil remedies are remarkably ill-suited to deter
police brutality. If the swiftness and certainty of punishment are
essential to the credibility of a deterrent, then the general absence of
these factors from private civil litigation may be one reason why civil
suits fail to deter. Quite simply, the threat of liability resulting from
a civil suit is not sufficient to change police behavior.
Furthermore, the particularly egregious acts of police violence
that occasionally lead to the death of a minority youth are relatively
rare, and civil suits arising from those events fail to deter future
brutality because police officers fail to identify substantially with a
fellow officer who is sued for killing a suspect-precisely because the
acts or the chain of events giving rise to such a suit occur infrequent-
ly.57 Hence, infrequent civil suits arising out of the widely-publicized
deaths-rather than out of the frequent, nonfatal "street justice"
routinely administered by the police-will not provide the identifiabil-
ity or relevance likely to deter the daily acts of police brutality.
57. Police officers, like the public, view such occurrences as exceptional and generally
fail to see the connection between the daily pummeling of suspects and the "simple
assault" that occasionally has "unfortunate consequences." See supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
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The primary objection to relying on civil suits to punish and
deter police brutality, however, is not that such suits are generally
unsuccessful at punishing the malefactor, compensating the victim, or
deterring similar conduct. Rather, it is that it is simply immoral not
to punish such conduct in the criminal justice system, where any
civilian who committed the same acts would be punished. It is
morally indefensible to hold our law enforcement officers to a lesser
standard of conduct than that which applies to the rest of the
population." Except where there is a statute that explicitly treats
police officers differently from private citizens, an act that is a crime
when committed by the average person should be a crime when
committed by a police officer. Surely the concept of equal justice
demands as much. Any system that punishes police criminality
outside of the criminal justice arena therefore fails to satisfy the
requirements of basic morality.59
In addition to satisfying the requirements of basic morality, the
threat of criminal prosecution of police officers for unjustified assaults
on civilians would serve as a substantial deterrent to police brutality.
If even "petty" assaults could be prosecuted against police officers,just
as they are against civilians today, the deterrent effect on other
officers would be correspondingly broader.6" Using the criminal
58. If the self-evident quality of this statement is not immediately apparent, try
substituting "politicians," "officeholders," "judges," "prosecutors," or "public servants" for
"law enforcement officers" in the above sentence.
59. It is politically inexpedient to propose a system that would not have this moral
failing, however, given the power and organization of the police, their unions, and their
civilian and political allies. That is why even well-intentioned suggestions for improve-
ments to the civil suit and police review board disciplinary system explicitly sacrifice the
requirements of pure morality in favor of a perceived, greater "realism." For example,
shortly after the verdict in the state of California's criminal case against the four officers
for beating Rodney King, a well-respected federal judge suggested new legislation that
would empower the federal government to bring civil police-misconduct litigation on
behalf of brutality victims against the state or city that employed the offending officers.
Jon 0. Newman, How to Protect Other Rodney Kings, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A35.
Newman's suggestion, editorially endorsed by the New York Times, see A New Weapon Against
Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at A30, has all the benefits of pragmatism, as well as all
the moral detriments of the current system; that is, while it would be an improvement, it
allows the double standard between police criminals and nonpolice criminals to continue.
60. The theory that deterrence will occur only if one pays attention to the minor
violations is consistent with the management style of some of the most successful police
administrators in the country:
Like other effective administrators, [former Newark Police Chief Hubert]
Williams suspended officers even for verbal abuse. Workers who made racist slurs
normally received two days off without pay, he said.
"The issue is how you treat people," Williams said. When officers use
language that characterizes people as subhuman, "you've got to be absolutely
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justice system to resolve police assault cases would also provide more
immediate satisfaction for the victim; even the slowest criminal case
ordinarily progresses much more quickly than, for example, a federal
civil rights action or a civil suit against a police officer for damages.
The relative swiftness of a criminal action would also provide a more
immediate and more credible deterrent to police officers. Moreover,
even if the complainant is "unattractive" in the sense that a jury may
not feel great sympathy for his plight, that discrepancy of social
position would be offset somewhat by the fact that the police officer
would be required to occupy the same chair as anyone else who is
arrested, accused of a crime, and labelled a "defendant." As discussed
below, however, there is no realistic threat of such criminal prosecu-
tions within the criminal justice system as it is currently adminis-
tered.6"
C. Why Criminal Charges Fail to Deter-The Symbiotic Relationship
Between the Police and the District Attorney
The Los Angeles District Attorney's office indicted four police
officers in the Rodney King incident, but the nineteen other officers
at the scene, who neither attempted to stop the assault nor reported
it to their superiors,6" were not indicted. The District Attorney
referred matters of liability under federal civil rights law to the United
States Attorney; after the State case resulted in acquittals, the United
States Attorney indicted only the same four officers. 6
The failure of both the local district attorney and the federal
prosecutor to prosecute any of the other officers is anything but
surprising, as a study by Professor Schwartz of the University of
Pennsylvania has confirmed.' 4 Schwartz analyzed the outcomes of
approximately twenty-five police violence complaints filed by civilians
with the Philadelphia District Attorney's office. He determined that
"the District Attorney's office has not been, and, in the nature of
clear it will not be tolerated."
Added Richard Artison, Milwaukee County, Wis., sheriff, "You have to zero
in on verbal abuse or the next thing you know, you'll have physical misconduct."
GANNETr REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
61. See infra Part I.C.-D.
62. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
64. Louis B. Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the Community Rights
Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1970). This
study was carried out with the cooperation of the District Attorney and at the request of
the Civil Rights Commission of the Philadelphia Bar Association. Id. at 1023.
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things, could not be, an effective instrument for controlling police
violence." 6
5
Schwartz cited a number of factors common to all local district
attorneys' offices, from which he concluded that the local prosecutors'
offices face "a hopeless conflict-of-interest" in handling police violence
complaints: the District Attorney's office must investigate the
defendant's allegations of brutality against the police while simulta-
neously investigating the police charges against the defendant.66
This places the District Attorney's office in an impossible position.
Effective prosecution of criminal defendants demands close coopera-
tion with numerous investigating police officers, and the successful
prosecution of police officers also depends on this relationship.
Therefore, District Attorneys have no choice but to rely on inherently
biased investigations of accused officers conducted by their own
departments. 67 Internal investigations almost always exonerate the
officers involved.'a
Schwartz also found that the prosecutor's office rarely will charge
a police officer with brutality unless the injury to the civilian is both
substantial and well-documented.6 0 Because of the overwhelming
caseload, the prosecutor frequently will attempt to get both the officer
and the civilian to withdraw their complaints against each other.7
Aware of this tactic, police officers who fear that a suspect will file an
excessive force complaint will counter it by charging the citizen with
65. Id. at 1024.
66. Id. Schwartz found that civilian complaints are brought most often by those who
have already been charged by the police with having committed crimes. Id. Sometimes
this conflict of interest becomes quite stark; Schwartz cited the fact that during the trial
of two police officers for assault and battery, prosecuted by the Philadelphia District
Attorney's office, both the First Assistant District Attorney and the Police Commissioner
spent time sitting at the defense table! Id. at 1025.
67. Id. at 1025; see also GANNETr REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 ("District attorneys are
reluctant to indict officers, law enforcement experts say, because they depend on police
to handle their criminal investigations.").
68. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. "Police turn soft on crime when they
investigate their own brutality." Id.
After a stint in internal affairs, most officers know they may wind up working side
by side again with the police they investigate. If they get into a dangerous spot,
they will have to rely on these fellow officers for protection. "Their lives will
literally depend on their performance .... "
Given such stakes, it should come as no surprise that police would be
tempted to cover up abuse.
Id at 5.
69. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1026.
70. Id.
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a minor crime, thereby gaining a bargaining chip."
This combination of factors creates a symbiotic relationship
between the police and the prosecutors that virtually guarantees that
no local district attorneyt-in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, or else-
where-will pursue police brutality prosecutions vigorously.72 As a
result, police officers know that there is no realistic threat of criminal
prosecution by the local district attorney, who must preserve his or
her working relationship with the police. This failure to prosecute
effectively removes much of the deterrent effect that criminal
prosecutions could create. As discussed below, the prosecutor's
monopoly over the criminal justice system further ensures that the
avenue of criminal prosecution for police brutality will remain closed
to the average victim.
71. Knowing of this caseload problem, the police cynically take advantage of it:
Most brutality victims get charged with some minor crime. The hope is the
victim will drop the abuse complaint if the officer promises to drop the charges,
said Ronald Hampton, executive director of the National Black Police Associa-
tion.
The practice is so common that it almost has become an unwritten rule. At
a trial in Los Angeles last spring, a deputy sheriff said he learned about it at his
police academy: "When you hurt them, you arrest them."
GANNETr REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. In a recent example, charges of disorderly conduct
and misdemeanor assault brought against a gay rights demonstrator were dismissed by an
angryjudge in Manhattan, who found, after hearing the testimony of witnesses and viewing
two independent videotapes of the incident, that the only "violent, tumultuous, and
threatening behavior"-the demonstrator's alleged crime-"was on the part of the police."
James Barron, Judge Denounces 'Lawless' Beating by Police at Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991,
at BI. The judge found that the police had attacked the demonstrators "without any
apparent provocation" and then lied about the incident to cover it up. Richard Perez-
Pena, Man Beaten by Officers Settles Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1994, at B4. Although all
criminal charges against the demonstrators were dismissed, the judge condemned the
police, and the City of New York settled the civil case for $350,000. Id. The police officers
involved were never disciplined. Id.
72. In the case arising from the beating of the gay rights demonstrator, supra note 71,
thejudge found that the assistant prosecutor not only had failed to investigate the brutality
charge, but also had testified in a less than believable manner. Barron, supra note 71, at
BI. The Manhattan District Attorney's office even announced that it was appealing the
dismissal of the charges against the demonstrator and that it was "not investigating police
brutality in the incident." Emily Sachar, Charges Dropped Against Gay Activist, NEWSDAY, Oct.
1, 1991, at 23.
The prosector's decisions in this case seem calculated more to win points with the
police then to pursue justice. In fact, the appeal was subsequently withdrawn. James
Barron, Prosecutor's Appeal Dropped On Police Beating of Protestor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991,
at B4. The full text of the trial judge's decision can be found in People v. Hennelly,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 21.
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D. Prosecutorial Discretion; Prosecutorial Monopoly
Prosecutors enjoy unparalleled power in our society.73  Tradi-
tionally, this power has manifested itself most clearly in the prose-
cutor's decision whether to bring charges against an alleged criminal
offender.74  Concurrent with this power, as with many powers, there
exists the great potential for abuse. 75  Abuse can result both from
73. See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
190 (1971). Davis quotes former Attorney General, later justice, Jackson:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens
investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune
of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimidations. Or the prosecutor may
choose a more subtle course and simply have a citizen's friends interviewed ....
He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the defense never has a
chance to be heard . . . . If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it
follows that he can choose his defendants . . . . [A] prosecutor stands a fair
chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost
anyone . .. . It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks some person
whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular
persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of
prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal ....
Id. See also Sweeney v. Balkcom, 358 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1966) (characterizing
prosecutors as "not unknown to have political whips to crack" and "usually in the driver's
seat.").
74. WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 623-25 (2d ed. 1992).
One former federal prosecutor has written: "In our legal system, the prosecutor possesses
extraordinary discretion that is sweeping, unreviewable and, for the most part, is exercised
in secret." George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practical and Ethical Problems of Prosecuting Public
Officials, 36 MD. L. REV. 5 (1976); see DAVIS, supra note 73, at 224 ("The enormous and
much abused power of prosecutors not to prosecute is almost completely uncontrolled,
even though I can find no reason to believe that anyone planned it that way-or that
anyone would.").
75. Aside from police brutality cases, other cases in which some prosecutors may abuse
their power by failing to pursue indictments vigorously are cases involving governmental
corruption and official misconduct. See Frampton, supra note 74, at 14 ("[M]ost
prosecutors are reluctant to go after high-ranking elected officials unless it appears that
very solid evidence of criminality can be adduced. This reluctance is based not so much
on fear of the public official's power as on respect for his role in the political system.").
Again the "double standard" of public responsibility and accountability is raised: "Our
system of separate powers has fostered a strong institutional and historical understanding
that the ultimate and most appropriate sanction against the wrongdoing of elected public
officials and their direct appointees is through the political process, not the criminal law."
Id. Frampton describes the way the evidence was considered in the Watergate investiga-
tion:
[T]he evidence against potential defendants was not weighed against the
standard of probable cause but against a much higher standard: whether the
prosecutors were convinced to a reasonable certainty that after hearing the
Government's evidence and the probable defense case, a jury would conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. This higher standard
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decisions to bring prosecutions and from decisions to forego them.7 6
In the United States, we commonly assume that the prosecutor
must have great discretion, that the prosecutor need not explain to
anyone his decision to prosecute or not to prosecute,77 and that it
is inappropriate for the judiciary to review the exercise of prosecutori-
al discretion.78  As Professor Davis points out, however, it remains
unclear why we have determined that it is necessary for the prosecutor
to possess such unfettered discretion. 79 Davis suggests that deference
to prosecutorial discretion is a custom not unlike many other customs,
is probably close to that actually employed by many other responsible prosecu-
tors, especially in public corruption cases.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Federal prosecutors are loathe to go after corrupt public
officials:
The decision to investigate and charge a public official with a crime
inevitably takes the prosecutor into unfamiliar and dangerous territory. The
public interest in the integrity and continued effective functioning of government
comes into play. This is a factor that the prosecutor, who is not directly
accountable to the electorate, finds discomforting to assess. As for the politician
or public official, he is likely to suffer irreparable injury if indicted, regardless of
the outcome of the trial. And no matter how strong his case, the prosecutor also
rarely emerges unscathed. If he obtains a conviction he will likely be accused of
political bias, of "fronting" for the political enemies of the defendant, and of
usurping the role of the electorate in policing the morality of its public officials.
If the jury refuses to convict, all of these accusations may be confirmed in the
public mind, and the prosecutor himself may be destroyed. A responsible prosecutor
will seldom be eager to incur these risks to himself and to the public without a case founded
on particularly compelling evidence.
Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
76. A decision not to prosecute is inherently less public than a decision to prosecute
and therefore even more susceptible to improper influences or decision criteria:
Prosecutions are often withheld, sometimes on the basis of political, personal or
other ulterior influence, without guiding rules as to what will or will not be
prosecuted, without meaningful standards stemming from either legislative bodies
or from prosecutors themselves, through decisions secretly made and free from
criticism, without supporting findings of fact, unexplained by reasoned opinions,
and free from any requirement that the decisions be related to precedents.
DAVIS, supra note 73, at 224.
77.
Why these various assumptions are made is not easy to discover; the best short
answer seems to be that no one has done any systematic thinking to produce the
assumptions, but that the customs about prosecuting, like most other customs,
are the product of unplanned evolution. Whatever caused the assumptions to
grow as they did, prosecutors usually assert that everybody knows that they are
necessary.
Id, at 189.
78. Id. at 188-89. Many cases have made this deference to prosecutorial discretion
explicit. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 447 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1973) (holding that the prosecutor's decision to investigate, arrest, and prosecute
various state officials was wholly within the discretion of the U.S. Attorney's Office).
79. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 189.
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one whose origin is "the product of unplanned evolution."s Yet,
aside from custom, why should a district attorney have absolute power
to decide not to prosecute, especially in cases for which there is
clearly sufficient evidence for a conviction?8 '
Defenders of prosecutorial discretion argue that if the prosecut-
ing attorney exercises his discretion inappropriately, the electorate
can vote him out at the next election. However, most of the
prosecutorial decisionmaking process is "kept secret, so that review by
the electorate is nonexistent except for the occasional case that
happens to be publicized.""2
One solution to the problem of abuse of prosecutorial discretion,
suggested by Professor Davis, is that courts provide the same review
for prosecutorial abuses and errors as they now provide for adminis-
trative agency actions.8 3 The principle that prosecutorial decisions
were inappropriate for judicial review evolved at a time when actions
of the executive branch generally were thought to be unreviewable.
In light of the evolution of our jurisprudence, however, executive
80. Id.
81. Davis notes that even asking this question can be difficult:
[T]he habit of assuming that of course the prosecutor's decision must be
uncontrolled is so deeply embedded that the usual implied response to questions
as to whether the prosecuting power can be confined or structured or checked
is that the questioner must be totally without understanding. Inability of those
who are responsible for administering the system to answer the most elementary
questions as to the reasons behind the system is itself a reason to reexamine.
Id. at 191. But other countries do not necessarily share the view that prosecutors should
have unfettered discretion. Professor Davis found that, unlike the American system, the
prosecutorial system in then-West Germany had stripped the prosecutor of the power to
decline to prosecute when the evidence and law were sufficiently clear. Id. at 194. "This
means that selective enforcement, a major feature of the American system, is almost wholly
absent from the German system." Id, Even where the law is unclear or the evidence
dubious, the German prosecutor does not make the decision; he "almost always presents
a doubtful case to the judge, who determines the sufficiency of the evidence and the
proper interpretation of the law." Id.
But seeJohn H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth"
and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1564-65 (1978) ("The rule of compulsory prosecution is
limited by statute to cases of serious crime . . . ."); Albert S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus,
The Myth ofJudicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87
YALE L.J. 240, 275-76 (1977) (positing that the German system has merely shifted the
discretion to the police). Davis concedes that his interpretation of the nondiscretionary
prosecutorial system in Germany may not be completely precise, but argues that in the
great majority of crimes, the German prosecutor generally has no discretion to exercise.
DAvis, supra note 73, at 195.
82. DAvIS, supra note 73, at 208-09; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 372-73 (arguing that
it is unrealistic to rely on either the governor or the general populace to police
prosecutorial decisionmaking because of the secretive nature of the process).
83. DAvis, supra note 73, at 211-14.
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branch actions now can be reviewed to protect against abuse.
Therefore, the arguments in favor of reconsidering the doctrine of
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion are extremely persuasive.84
Another avenue worthy of exploration is the implementation of
ethical guidelines to curb prosecutorial decisionmaking power.8 5
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution
Function and Defense Function includes model criteria to guide
prosecutors in their decision whether or not to prosecute. 86 Particu-
larly noteworthy in the commentary to the standards is the statement
that "[a] prosecutor ordinarily should prosecute if, after full investiga-
tion, it is found that a crime has been committed, the perpetrator can
be identified, and there is sufficient admissible evidence available to
support a verdict of guilty."8 7 As potentially harmful to the innocent
as a decision to prosecute may be, a decision not to prosecute is more
final because it is not checked or reviewed by any other agency.88
Indeed, Davis estimates that nine out of ten abuses of prosecutorial
discretion stem from refusals to prosecute-decisions never reviewed
by any court."9
Lastly, a few other commentators have suggested turning to the
grand jury for protection against abuse. The National District
Attorney's Association originally conceded that the grand jury may act
84. Id. at 229; see also Note, The Use of Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial Discretion, 13
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 563, 569 (1976) (suggesting the creation of a "prosecutorial procedure
act").
85. There is some precedent for setting such guidelines for prosecutors. E.g., MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1986) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (stating
that "[t ] he responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1991) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
Guidelines already exist to govern the prosecutor's conduct before the grand jury.
For example, the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice require a
prosecutor to give "due deference" to the grand jury's "status as an independent legal
body." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-3.5(a) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. Although the prosecutor
can give legal advice and express opinions, he or she "should not make statements or
arguments in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner which would be
impermissible at trial before a petit jury." Id. 3-3.5(b).
86. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 85, 3-3.9.
87. Id. at 3-3.9 commentary. But cf. REPORT ON COURTS § 1.2 (National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 1973) (finding that generally the
prosecutor should retain the discretion to determine when to prosecute, but concluding
that the decision not to prosecute should be reviewable by the courts for abuse of discre-
tion).
88. DAvIS, supra note 73, at 188, 190-91.
89. Id. at 191 n.2. "Of one thousand decisions not to prosecute, the usual number
totally unknown to judges is probably one thousand." Id. at 209 n.21.
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as a check on the prosecutor and initiate criminal charges.9" And
the American Bar Association has acknowledged that, although the
charging decision should be vested primarily in the public prosecutor,
there are jurisdictions "[w] here the law permits a citizen to complain
directly to a judicial officer of the grand jury .... .""
II. THE GRAND JURY OPTION
It is the final option mentioned above-turning to the grand
jury-upon which the remainder of this Article will focus. Specifical-
ly, this Article will explore the concept of the victim's access to the
grand jury-against the wishes of the public prosecutor-in the
context of police brutality cases and other instances of governmental
90. NATIONAL DIsTRICr ATrORNEY'S ASSOcIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
8.1 (1977) ("The decision to initiate or pursue criminal charges should be within the
discretion of the prosecutor, excepting only the grand jury, and whether the screening
takes place before or after formal charging, it should be pursuant to the prosecutor's
established guidelines.").
This concession is no longer quite as clear as it once was. The second edition of these
standards, the only national standards written by prosecutors exclusively, reads, perhaps
unsurprisingly, like a Christmas list for district attorneys. The section on "Prosecutor's
Relations with the Grand Jury" parrots the directives of the ABA Standards on that issue.
NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 60.2-.3
(2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NDAA STANDARDS]; cf ABA STANDARDS, supra note 85, 3-3.5(a)-
(b). The newer edition contains no direct reference to the initiation of a prosecution by
a grand jury. See NDAA STANDARDS, supra, 43.1 ("In the exercise of the discretion to
prosecute, the prosecutor should determine which charges should be filed and how
charges should be presented before a grand jury or court."). On the other hand, the
NDAA does not completely shut the door of the grand jury in the faces of volunteer
witnesses or crime victims: under the rubric "Investigative Function," the second edition
states that "[e]ach state should determine the precise scope of grand jury investigatory
functions." NDAA STANDARDS, supra, 59.1.
91. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 85, 3-3.4(d). The third edition suggests that the
complainant should be directed to first bring his complaint to the prosecutor and that the
prosecutor's "action or recommendation thereon" should be made known to the pertinent
judge or grand jury. Id. The first edition of these standards took a more favorable stance
toward this possibility: "[u]nder some systems a citizen may take a complaint directly to
a grand jury and such a 'safety valve' has much to commend itself." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINALJUSTICE RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
2.1 commentary (1971). Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit also believed that the
prosecutor should not have a monopoly on the discretionary decision whether or not to
prosecute:
We should not forget that our District Attorneys are elected officials, that
they must stand for election at stated intervals, and this makes them subject to
pressures and temptations if they have the power to act alone, and that there may
well be some cases where it would not be in the public interest to give them the
sole power to determine when charges should be brought.
J. Edward Lumbard, The CriminalJustice Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y. ST. BJ. 397,
400 (1967).
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misconduct, because these cases: (1) often involve a built-in
prosecutorial conflict of interest, (2) present every opportunity for the
public prosecutor to drag his feet, and (3) pose questions of
enormous public importance.92
An important threshold question is whether there is any reason
to believe that the grand jury would provide any greater prosecutorial
assistance to the victim than the public prosecutor would provide, if
victims had access to the grand jury. Some critics of the grand jury
contend that the body is merely a "tool" of the prosecutor, a "rubber
stamp" of approval for his or her actions.93 One commentator has
observed that "[t]here seems to be universal agreement in urban
areas that prosecutors effectively control the actions of grand
jurors." 4 Even the Supreme Court of California has observed:
The grand jury is independent only in the sense that it is not
formally attached to the prosecutor's office; though legally
free to vote as they please, grand jurors virtually always
assent to the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney,
a fact borne out by available statistical and survey data....
The pervasive prosecutorial influence reflected in such
statistics has led an impressive array of commentators to
endorse the sentiment expressed by United States District
Judge William Campbell, a former prosecutor: "Today, the
grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is
candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time,
for almost anything, before any grand jury."95
92. It bears repeating that, although this Article focuses on police brutality and other
governmental misconduct, this procedure is equally available to the victim of any crime
in the penal code of the jurisdiction in which it was committed.
93. Frampton, supra note 74, at 5-6; see also Richard A. Carp, The Harris County Grand
Jury-A Case Study, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 90 (1974) [hereinafter Carp, Harris County Grand Juy]
(discussing the results of an empirical survey conducted of grand jurors in Harris County,
Texas). Carp found that one grand jury voted on 80% of its cases without any discussion
following the prosecutor's presentation. Id. at 101. Furthermore, he found evidence of
"grand jury shopping" by prosecutors when more than one grand jury was sitting
concurrently. Id. at 118-19.
94. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
86 n.84 (1968-69).
95. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916, 919 (Cal. 1978) (quoting William J.
Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973)); accord
RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 127-28 (1929) ("[T]he grandjury
has now come to be a group of men ... who function under the dictation of the
prosecutor."). One possible reason for prosecutorial dominance over the grand jury is that
"the only person who has a clear idea of what is happening in the grand jury room is the
public official whom these twenty-three novices are expected to check." Melvin P. Antell,
The Modern Grand Juiy: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A-B.A.J. 153, 154 (1965).
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Although there is substantial evidence showing that the grand
jury frequently has been the prosecutor's puppet, such an outcome
is not inevitable; in fact, there have been some remarkably indepen-
dent grand juries.96 Therefore, perhaps the most significant attrib-
ute of the grand jury function today is the twin states of ignorance
involved: first, the grand jurors do not understand the extent of their
own independent powers, and second, neither crime victims nor their
attorneys realize that they can approach the grand jury-even over
the prosecutor's objection-either directly or through the impaneling
judge.
Because we know of the extent to which today's grand juries are
mere surrogates for the prosecutor, it is difficult to think of the
institution with great respect. In fact, without a great deal of
research, most lawyers are unlikely to know that they may seek
indictments, even over the objection of the local prosecutor. More
likely, a lawyer will tell a client that there is no remedy in the criminal
justice system for the harm the client has suffered; the only remedy
is by way of civil suit. Yet the benefits of public access to the grand
jury are significant. Civilian participation in criminal prosecution
brings an entirely different perspective to law enforcement.9 7 When
citizens are free to approach the grand jury directly or through the
impaneling judge, the grand jury "'breathes the spirit of the com-
munity' as no prosecutor could ever do."98 As the following section
describes, the grand jury actually has been the voice of the people
throughout American history; the present degree of prosecutorial
domination is an unfortunate-but not irreversible-development.99
96. See infra Part II.A. for historical examples of grand jury initiative and indepen-
dence.
97. The grand jury "is useful in bringing to bear the conscience of the community at
the point where the criminal justice system is sought to be invoked." State v.Johnson, 441
N.W.2d 460, 468 (Minn. 1989) (Simonett, J., dissenting in part). After all, as George
Bernard Shaw noted, "all professions are a conspiracy against the laity." Id. at 469
(Simonett,J., dissenting in part).
98. RIcHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634-1941, at 230 (1963) (quoting United States District Attorney George Z.
Medalie, Grand Juries Value, THE PANEL, Mar.-Apr. 1931, at 16).
99. Id. at 225 ("The grand jury served as an agency of law and order in the West, and
while it may have lacked the efficiency and singleness of purpose of the public prosecutor,
it made up for this deficiency by emphasizing democratic participation in law enforce-
ment.").
298 [VOL. 53:271
POLICE BRUTALITY AND GRAND JURY ACCESS
A. History of the American Grand Jury: The Role of Citizen Participation
Today's image of the grand jury as a group of citizens who
usually ratify, and only occasionally defy, the wishes of the local
prosecutor glosses over entirely the grand jury's remarkable history in
this country. The grand jury historically has exercised extraordinary
power. The English colonists brought the institution of the grand
jury with them, and it became an important fixture in early American
life. Grand juries "acted in the nature of local assemblies: making
known the wishes of the people, proposing new laws, protesting
against abuses in government, performing administrative tasks, and
looking after the welfare of their communities."10°
For example, grand juries in Maryland involved themselves in the
surveying of land in border controversies in addition to considering
indictments."° In Dover, Massachusetts, grand jurors accused the
officials of the town of neglecting to keep the stocks in good working
order.102 Pennsylvania grand jurors performed tax assessments,
awarded contracts for building bridges within their jurisdiction, and
inspected public buildings, bridges, and jails."' Grand juries in the
Carolinas undertook similar endeavors. 0 4 New Jersey grand juries
also levied taxes and audited expenditures of county money, scruti-
nized the records of the county treasurer, and inspected county
roads.'0 5 In Virginia, the grand jury became part of the county
courts, which themselves "were more than mere courts. They
exercised legislative and executive as well as judicial authority. They
acted as fiscal agents, levying taxes and directing disbursement of
funds. They supervised the construction and maintenance of roads
and bridges, cared for public buildings, and appointed local offi-
cials."' 6 The Virginia grand jury "took on such tasks as setting the
price to be paid for private property taken for public use and
reporting on the condition of roads, bridges, and public build-
ings. "107
Furthermore, in states in which there were no representative
legislatures, grand juries tended to fill the vacuum. For example, a
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 12 n.13.
102. Id. at 7 n.3.
103. Id. at 15 n.22.
104. Id. at 16.
105. Id. at 13.




New York grand jury sitting in Albany in 1688 declared that those who
sold spirits were required to provide lodging for men and their
horses. 10 8  Another New York jury forbade riding over corn
fields."0 9 The grand jury became a medium for publicizing the
complaints of Georgia colonists as well."0 As Younger described it:
By the end of the Colonial period the grand jury had
become an indispensable part of government in each of the
American colonies. Grandjuries served as more than panels
of public accusers. They acted as local representative
assemblies ready to make known the wishes of the people.
They proposed new laws, protested against abuses in
government, and performed many administrative tasks.
They wielded tremendous authority in their power to
determine who should and who should not face trial. They
enforced or refused to enforce laws as they saw fit and stood
guard against indiscriminate prosecution by royal offi-
cials."'
Grand juries in frontier communities continued to suggest policy
and legislation; they labored to improve the general welfare of their
towns.112 Territorial and state laws directed grand juries to inquire
into the conditions of the local jails and the appropriateness of the
treatment of prisoners in addition to checking up on highway
supervisors and investigating local taverns." 3 Even in the absence
of such legislative direction, frontier jurors kept an eye on the
108. Id at 15.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id. at 26. After the Revolution, there were other social problems to be addressed.
Occasionally, [grand juries] reflected the general distrust of lawyers as a class.
In 1783, a South Carolina grand jury complained that most people were at a loss
to explain the fee system used by attorneys. The jurors recognized that "the
employing of lawyers in our courts ofjustice is a grievance that at present seems
necessary," but they urged passage of a law strictly regulating legal fees.
Id. at 42.
112. Id. at 72.
113. Id. at 79.
As in most territories, grandjurors in Idaho were under obligation to inspect
the local jail, and Judge Alexander Smith told Silver City jurors of their duty but
added, "I have been prospecting these parts for several days and haven't even
found any such shebang! You may find one, however, so look around." In
October, 1867, the jurors reported that the local jail was totally inadequate, with
locks and hinges of inferior quality. In the following year they recommended
that the jail and all county buildings be weatherboarded, asked the legislature to
amend the revenue laws so as to provide a cash fund for payment of contingents,
and called for an investigation of rates charged on toll roads.
Id. at 169.
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conditions of bridges, roads, and public buildings in their area."4
Other territories, like Arizona and New Mexico, expressly
directed grand juries to inquire into all "'wilful and corrupt miscon-
duct of public officials.' But even in those jurisdictions where there
was no specific statute, grand juries denounced and indicted public
officials they found guilty of malfeasance or corruption."15 The
Wasco County, Oregon, grand jury accused the county clerk and the
county judge of accepting improper fees; the grand jury of Kimble
County, Texas, attempted to dismiss the local sheriff and judge
because of their alleged failure to enforce the laws." 6
Since residents of territories had little say in their own govern-
ment, grand juries naturally became the vehicles for the transmission
of needs, desires, and protests. 1 7  For example, grand jurors of
Washington District, Mississippi Territory, informed Congress that,
unrepresented as they were in that body, they would use the grand
jury to voice their grievances."' On their own initiative, grand
juries suggested laws and public projects which they believed would
help their communities; in addition, they petitioned local legislatures
and Congress." 9 Grand jurors were not shy about this function:
Jurors of Wayne County, Michigan Territory, dispatched a
memorial to President John Quincy Adams and the United
States Senate requesting that Solomon Sibly not be reap-
pointed to the territorial supreme court because of his
"mental imbecility." The jurors also protested againstJames
Witherall's appointment as chiefjustice, "due to superannua-
tion." 20
Grand juries proved particularly effective in uncovering illegal
business practices. When corporate officers declined to cooperate,
the jury's broad investigative powers were extremely valuable. The
grand jury's power to subpoena witnesses and records, supported by
the court's contempt powers, made it very successful in investigating
114. Id. at 80.
115. Id. at 160.
116. Id. at 161. For similar improprieties, the Justice of the Peace for Deer Lodge
County, Montana, was denounced and indicted by the grand jury. Id. (citing Territory v.
McElroy, 1 Mont. 86 (1868)).
117. Id. at 81.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 80. Chief Justice M.B. Begbie of British Columbia "stressed the importance
of inquests as spokesmen for their particular localities, calling attention 'with great
boldness' to their needs and grievances, speaking 'with an authority which no other body
possesses.'" Id. at 137.
120. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
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corporate misdoings.12' Grand juries investigated bank failures in
New York City,122 Milwaukee,123 and Chicago; 14 brokerage firms
in Baltimore; 125 and insurance companies in New York. 1 6  Grand
juries were active in antitrust investigations, indicting the American
Tobacco Company in New York 127 and a pool of fire insurance
companies in Kentucky.2 8  And grand juries were not loathe to
investigate the large meat packers, including Armour and Swift, and
other corporate giants like International Harvester and Standard
Oil. 29  Some grand juries were prolabor" and some vehemently
antilabor.3 When labor strikes and violence occurred, some grand
juries denounced both labor and management. 132 Although the
Sherman Act gave federal prosecutors the right to initiate criminal
proceedings by information rather than indictment, United States
attorneys learned that, without the grand jury's subpoena powers to
compel the testimony of witnesses and production of corporate
records, it was simply not feasible to initiate a Sherman Act proceed-
ing by information.
33
The grand jury system historically shone its brightest in the
investigation of municipal corruption. For example, although the
infamous Tweed Ring in New York City was attacked by many well-
intentioned reformers, it took a New York City grand jury to actually
break the Ring in 1872.13 The grand jury members conducted
their own investigation, independent of the district attorney's office.
[T] hey set out to find evidence against city officials without
the assistance of experts from the district attorney's office.
The jury summoned all manner of witnesses and interrogat-
ed them in secret session. To cover all possible sources of
information, the twenty-one jurors split up into committees
of two and three. These committees visited banks to check
on the accounts of public officials, called at the homes of
121. Id. at 209.
122. Id. at 209-10, 212.
123. Id. at 210.
124. Id. at 211-12.
125. Id. at 212.
126. Id. at 212-13.
127. Id. at 219.
128. Id. at 219-20.
129. Id. at 220-21.
130. Id. at 214, 217.
131. Id. at 214, 216, 217.
132. Id. at 213.
133. Id. at 222-23.
134. Id. at 182.
302 [VOL. 53:271
POLICE BRUTALITY AND GRAND JURY ACCESS
witnesses who were unable to come to the jury, and checked
the operations of each of the city departments. Even in
their off-duty hours, many of the jurymen tracked down
information useful in tracing frauds to the guilty parties.
Their task was not always an easy one. 135
The jury withstood all forms of social and political pressure, including
bribes and threats of force and, after more than a month of investiga-
tion, charged Tweed with submitting forged claims to the county for
payment.136  This charge was to be the first in a series of indict-
ments, including that of the City Comptroller."7 The court praised
the grand jury for its work, stating that its members had completed
"one of the most important, extraordinary and eventful sessions that
has ever marked the history of an American grand jury."3 1
A New York County grand jury reported in 1888 a tremendous
backload of excise cases in the district attorney's office. Grand jurors
concluded that this indicated either an inefficient office or a lack of
real desire to prosecute.139
The effectiveness with which a grand jury was able to
investigate well-organized and large scale corruption was
dependent to some extent upon the co-operation of the
county prosecutor. He alone could advise the jurors on
legal matters and attend their secret sessions. However,
prosecutors were often reluctant to have juries embark upon
broad inquiries. Sometimes they feared reprisals and
occasionally they themselves were deeply involved in graft-
ing. If the prosecuting attorney sought to stifle an investiga-
tion, its success depended largely upon the initiative and
ability of the foreman and his fellow jurymen. Although
grand inquests possessed ample authority to disregard the
county prosecutor and proceed without his advice, it took a
courageous and independent minded panel to do so.' 4
In another grand jury investigation that involved illegal gambling
in New York City, the Tammany Hall district attorney, A.B. Gardiner,
135. Id. at 185.
136. I.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 186 (quotingJudge Gunning S. Bedford). Fourteen years later, a New York
grand jury investigated the suspicious awarding of street railway franchises. Thirteen
aldermen on the City Council sold their votes for bribes. The grand jury indicted each
of the dishonest aldermen. A subsequent grand jury indicted the officers of the
corporation which gave the bribes. Id. at 186-87.




seemed less than enthusiastic.'41 Witnesses scheduled to be subpoe-
naed disappeared, and other witnesses declined to testify in front of
Gardiner. 42  Consequently, the jurors began to subpoena their
witnesses directly, without going through the District Attorney's
office.143 When one important witness was about to testify, the
foreman asked Gardiner to leave the room.' Gardiner objected,
and the entire grand jury assembled in front of the judge, who
eventually upheld the jury's exclusion request.'45 The grand jury
then took complete control of the investigation, speaking directly to
the judge for legal advice.'46 Gardiner eventually was removed by
the governor for failing to prosecute certain matters. 4
7
Even New York's famous corruption fighter, Thomas E. Dewey,
owed his appointment to the efforts of a combative grand jury that
was concerned with District Attorney William Dodge's foot-drag-
ging.148 The foreman of the jury finally took the lead in the investi-
gation and the jurors began calling their own witnesses, freezing out
the District Attorney. Lee Thompson Smith, the grand jury foreman,
insisted that the District Attorney appoint a special prosecutor. Grand
jurors and their investigators were threatened by criminals, but they
pressed their investigation. Finally, locked in disagreement with
Dodge, the grand jury petitioned the court to discharge them and
petitioned the Governor to impanel an extraordinary grand jury and
select a special rackets prosecutor to work with it. Governor Lehman
named Dewey to the post and impaneled a new jury.149 The special
grand jury called over five hundred witnesses in four months,
inquiring into racketeering and loansharking in labor unions and
trade associations. 5 °  This grand jury panel and its successor
eventually indicted "Lucky" Luciano and his top aides.'51 By the
time the investigation was over, the grand juries-and Mr. Dewey-







145. Id. at 188-89.
146. Id. at 189.
147. Id. at 190.
148. Id. at 234-35.
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In 1892, a Chicago grand jury indicted several aldermen in an
attempt to stop bribery and corruption.'53 Several grand juries
successfully battled graft in St. Louis in 1902.14 In 1905, in Milwau-
kee, a grand jury indicted eighteen county supervisors; and to ensure
a cleaner government, the jury recommended "periodic grand
juries." 155 In 1911, a Cincinnati grand jury also rescued the city
from a corrupt political machine.'56 Other grand jury investigations
of municipal corruption occurred in Cleveland,'57 Minneapolis,
Boston, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Buffalo, and Miami.'
The Minneapolis and San Francisco cases best exemplify the
extensive powers of the grand jury. When the Minneapolis public
prosecutor declined to cooperate with the grand jury's investigation
of corrupt municipal government, the jurors hired private detectives
to uncover the necessary evidence. 159 The grand jury indicted the
mayor for attempting to bribe county commissioners. 6 The mayor
was eventually forced to fire his brother, the police commissioner, and
then resign.'6 ' In this power vacuum "the grand jury assumed the
role of a committee of public safety. The jurors named an acting
mayor and stood ready to enforce his clean-up orders. "162
San Francisco had a series of crusading grand juries that
attempted to clean up the town from 1890 to 1907.16 Finally, they
achieved substantial success:
While the grand jurors were trying to trace the sources
of the various bribes paid to the supervisors, they also had to
deal with the problem of who was to govern San Francisco.
Mayor Schmitz stood indicted and all but a few of the
supervisors had confessed to accepting bribes. The people
had lost all confidence in the city administration and
newspapers began to agitate for the removal of guilty
persons. The decision was clearly up to the grand jury, for
it alone held the confidence of the citizens and could make
the supervisors do its bidding. To be completely unham-
153. Id. at 191-92.
154. Id. at 193-94.
155. Id. at 192-93.
156. Id. at 190-91.
157. Id. at 234.
158. Id. at 236-37.
159. Id. at 196.
160. Id. at 197.
161. Id. at 198.
162. Id. at 198-99.
163. Id. at 199-207.
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pered in their investigation, the jurors decided to allow the
old supervisors to remain and continue to manage the city's
affairs, but the grand inquest continued as the "power
behind the throne," holding the municipal legislators in line
through threat of indictment. In this manner, they assumed
control of executive and legislative as well as judicial affairs
in San Francisco. When the Car Workers' Union called a
strike against the United Railway Company and a bitter
struggle ensued, a committee of the grand jury warned
police officials against excessive brutality and threatened to
ask the governor for troops if the chief of police could not
keep order.' 6
The Mayor went to trial and was convicted, automatically ending
his term as mayor, and "the Board of Supervisors looked to the grand
jury to tell them who should be named as his successor." It was,
indeed, the grand jury that named the new mayor.165
Younger summarized the powers and performance of the grand
jury:
Where corruption extended to the office of the district
attorney, thc grand jury's ability to act effectively depended
upon its independence of the prosecutor. When necessary,
juries demonstrated that they could take investigations into
their own hands, ignoring the district attorney. . . . Under
extraordinary circumstances grand juries proved that they
could, if necessary, unseat an entire municipal administra-
tion and using their power of indictment, take over and run
a city in the name of the people. In both Minneapolis and
San Francisco, grand juries governed the city for long
periods while they rooted out crime and corruption. City
bosses, corrupt officials, and racketeering criminals learned
to fear the grand inquest, but to citizens seeking to rid their
city of corruption, it was often the only hope.'66
B. The Politics of Grand Juries and Judges
Although grand juries have historically provided a democratic
check on government, they are not a panacea for all overreaching or
politically motivated prosecutorial decisions. Just as public prosecu-
tors have been criticized for the politics of their choices about when,
164. Id. at 205-06.
165. Id. at 207.
166. Id. at 208.
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whom, and how to prosecute, 67 it also would be unrealistic not to
recognize that politics affect grand jury choices as well. In particular,
the impaneling judge and the people who compose the grand jury
itself affect that body's decisions.
Even before this nation was founded, judges occasionally
manipulated grand juries for their own political and propaganda
purposes.' 6a In the years prior to the American Revolution, judges
cajoled grand juries into issuing statements against the British military
presence; 169 after the Revolution, judges lectured grand jurors on
the issues of the day. 70 In fact, judges in the Western territories
often used their grand jury charges as an opportunity to deliver a
political speech or to lecture on the morality of the community.' 7'
When the Civil War began, federal judges used their grand jury
charges to dispute the South's right to secede. 17' During the war
itself,judges in the North used grand jury charges to urge support for
the Northern war effort and to denigrate the South.173
Grand jurors also developed their own political agendas. As the
eighteenth century progressed, many American colonists saw the
opportunity to use the grand jury to limit the power of royal officers
and to seek redress of grievances. 74  After independence from
England was declared, many grand juries issued reports condemning
the mother country and urging all colonists to join the war effort. 75
American grand juries issued indictments for treason against those
who enlisted in the British army or gave aid or information to the
British. 176 Grand juries also provided a voice of reason, restraining
antisedition prosecutors and mollifying war-time hysteria by refusing
167. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 290-91 (1968)
(discussing failures to prosecute offenses of questionable criminality as creating the
potential for abuse of discretion because the prosecutor can elect to prosecute only his
enemies or those from whom he can extort money); Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional
Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1034-35 (1967) (discussing
prosecutors' improper motives for pursuing certain cases).
168. YOUNGER, supra note 98, at 34.
169. Id. at 33-40.
170. Id. at 41. Judicial preaching was clearly evident at crucial points in this nation's
history, including following passage of the Constitution, id at 44, 47-48, in cases involving
Sedition Act indictments, id. at 51, and during the presidential race between Adams and
Jefferson. Id at 54.
171. Id. at 77. For example, in states where there were Mormon coloniesjudges rarely
lost an opportunity to deplore the sin of polygamy. Id at 159.
172. Id at 106.
173. Id. at 108.
174. Id. at 19.
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id. at 38.
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to indict on weak evidence. 177 Indeed, grand juries often reacted
negatively to heavy-handed, politicized jury charges given by partisan
judges.178
Grand juries have demonstrated independence in more recent
times as well. During the times of labor strife in the nineteenth
century, grand jury sympathies ranged from pro-business to pro-la-
bor.179  As grand juries have faced increasingly difficult social,
economic, and political issues, sharp disagreements have existed not
only among the jurors, but also between the jury and the prosecu-
tor.' Recent grand juries have had to deal with serious social
problems in making their decisions to indict or not, and have shown
remarkable wisdom. For example, grand juries have decided what
level of crime with which to charge a subway motorman whose
intoxication allegedly caused the deaths of five people in New York
City, 8 ' whether to indict a Hasidic man who lost control of his car
and caused the death of a young African-American boy,82 and
whether physician-assisted suicide constitutes murder.'83 Given the
rate of scientific advancement, political moodswings, and changes in
societal views, future grand juries will have to wrestle with issues that
will polarize public opinion even further. Nevertheless, there is every
reason to believe that grand jurors will continue to exercise the level
of good judgment and intelligence they have shown throughout the
history of the grand jury.
III. GAINING ACCESS TO THE GRAND JURY
The previous discussion is not meant to serve simply as a
historical survey. Rather, it is intended to demonstrate the awesome
powers of the grand jury and to encourage victims of police brutality
(or other governmental misconduct), and their attorneys, to gain
direct or judicial access to the grand jury when the local prosecutor
declines to prosecute. The particular path that a victim of police
177. Id. at 39-40, 51.
178. Id. at 49.
179. Id. at 214-17. "[W]hen the policies of large companies or the activities of
racketeering labor leaders led to strikes and violence, grandjuries intervened to investigate
and denounce the practice of both companies and unions." Id. at 213.
180. Robert A. Carp, The Behavior of Grand Juries: Acquiescence or Justice, 55 Soc. Scl. Q.
853, 865 (1975) [hereinafter Carp, Behavior of Grand Juries].
181. Calvin Sims, Jurors Indict Motorman for Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at Bi.
182. John Kifner, Grand Juiy Doesn't Indict Driver in Death of Boy in Crown Heights, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at Al.
183. William Douglas, Murder Charge for MD: 'Suicide Machine' Inventor's Arrest Could Be
Test Case, NEWSDAY (City ed.), Feb. 6, 1992, at 6.
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brutality will take to achieve this goal will depend greatly upon the
jurisdiction in which the offense occurred. As the remaining portion
of this Article will show, there exists ample state constitutional,
statutory, and common law to support the exercise of such a right of
access. The following sections discuss five categories of states: those
that permit direct citizen access to the grand jury by case law, those
that permit such access by statute, those that recognize a constitution-
al right of access, those that permit a judge to exercise discretion in
permitting access, and states in which the law is less clear. Individual
states will be discussed separately within each category.
A. States Allowing Direct Access to the Grand Jury by Case Law
There are six states in which state courts have recognized the
right of the victim of a crime to approach a member or members of
the grand jury directly: Texas, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia,
Maryland, and Minnesota. The states and their relevant case law are
described below.
1. Texas.-Texas law clearly permits a crime victim or witness to
approach the grand jury directly. The leading case, Hott v.
Yarbrough,184 arose out of a suit for libel. Hott wrote directly to the
foreman of the grand jury, requesting the opportunity to testify before
the grand jury about how Yarbrough and others had defrauded
him. 85 The court held that the victim of a crime had both a clear
right and a duty to report the crime to the grand jury:
It is unquestionably the right, if not in fact the duty, of every
one who has knowledge of the commission of a criminal
offense, punishment to the party guilty whereof is a matter
of general public interest, to call to the attention of the
grand jury the facts within his knowledge, to the end that
they may have proper investigation and such action as the
grand jury may deem advisable. Equally clear is the right of
any one who may consider himself aggrieved by the actual
or supposed commission of a crime to call the matter to the
attention of the grand jury for investigation and action. The
184. 245 S.W. 676 (Tex. 1922).
185. Id. The issue of libel arose because of Hott's letter to the grand jury foreman. I&
at 678-79. Yarborough claimed that Hott's letter was libelous. In defense, Hott claimed
that the letter was covered by an absolute privilege. Id. at 676. The court agreed with
Hott, stating that the grand jury's role as an "arm of the court" demanded that a citizen's




law does not restrict the method by which this may be
done. 8 6
The court based its holding on Article 432 of the then-current
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.8 7 Article 432 required the
grand jury to investigate all potentially indictable offenses of which its
members gained knowledge either on their own, through a state's
attorney, or through "any other credible person."8 8 Although the
precise wording of that article has been subsequently amended, its
meaning is the same and the phrase "or any other credible persof'
remains the same as well. 8 9
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit further
confirmed that a Texas citizen who has witnessed a crime or who has
been a victim of a crime may contact a member of the sitting grand
jury directly to ask for an investigation and for the right to testify. 9 '
Although the law on citizen access to the grand jury is completely
clear in Texas, it is extremely doubtful that this right is exercised very
frequently. This is probably because virtually no one in Texas seems
to know about it.
The best empirical work on Texas grand juries has been done by
Robert A. Carp.' 9 ' From November, 1971, through February, 1972,
Professor Carp sat on the 177th District Court GrandJury in Houston,
Texas. 192 Carp, a political scientist from the University of Houston,
kept careful records of that grand jury.93 Under Carp's supervision,
members of previous Harris County grand juries were interviewed
extensively for academic purposes. 19 In addition, Carp sent ques-
tionnaires to all members of Harris County grand juries between 1969
and 1972.195 Carp found empirical evidence that the district
attorney dominated the grand jury proceedings; the grand jury
186. Id. at 678-79.
187. Id
188. Id. (quoting TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 432).
189. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 20.09 (emphasis added). The only major change
was the substitution of the words "the grand jury shall inquire" for the words "[i]t is the
duty of the grand jury to inquire" at the beginning of the article.
190. See Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 368 n.21 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Under Texas law,
the grand jury has the authority to conduct their own investigations, to subpoena evidence
and witnesses, . . . and to indict on matters as to which the district attorney has presented
no evidence and sought no indictment.").
191. Carp, Harris County Grand Jury, supra note 93.
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acquiesced overwhelmingly in the prosecutor's recommendations. 196
Fully eighty percent of the cases submitted to Carp's grand jury were
voted upon without any discussion whatsoever.' 97 In the end, most
grand juries deferred to the expertise and judgment of the district
attorney in determining whether or not to indict.' 98 In fact, Carp
found that, where two or more grand juries were sitting simultaneous-
ly, the district attorney would take certain types of cases to the grand
jury he expected would respond most cooperatively to the pros-
ecutor's wishes-what might be called "grand jury shopping." 199
Curiously, Carp's excellent study' °° of the Texas grand jury
makes absolutely no mention of the citizen's right to direct access to
the grandjury. However, on the first day the grand jury sat Dr. Carp
overheard the district attorney tell the foreman that there was a
mailbox in the courthouse where any citizen could put any communi-
cation to the grand jury.0 1 The prosecutor told the foreman to
196. Carp, Behavior of Grand Juries, supra note 180, at 854, 860, 868.
197. Carp, Harris County Grand Juy, supra note 93, at 101.
198. Id. at 114.
199. Id. at 116-18. An extreme example of this occurred in 1989, when an unusual
grand jury was selected in Harris County. There were more than twenty people on the list
submitted to Judge Norman Lanford, but only fourteen appeared on the date when the
grand jury was to be chosen. Since two were removed for reasons of conflict, the judge
was forced to accept the remaining twelve. The problem was that five of the twelve were
lawyers, including, as foreman, Randy Schaffer, who was already well-known for
representing Randall Dale Adams, who was released from prison after his guilt was assailed
in the film "The Thin Blue Line." Lisa Belkin, Grand Juiy Disruption: 5 Lawyers and a Feud,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at 30.
It quickly became clear that the lawyer-laden jury was a breed apart. While
the average grand jury in Harris County refuses to issue indictments in 3 percent
of the cases it hears, this one refused indictments in 9 percent of the cases. It
was enough of a change to shake prosecutors' faith that they pretty much control
the process.
Since then, Harris County prosecutors have stopped bringing cases to this
grand jury. Some are still assigned automatically, but prosecutors have been
steering the cases over which they have discretion to otherjuries, especially when
the cases result from a long police investigation in which the suspects have not
yet been arrested.
Five grand juries sit at one time and the four others have heard an average
of 590 cases since mid-August. Mr. Schaffer's grand jury has heard 450 cases.
The five groups meet in rooms along the same hallway, and while the other juries
meet all day, his group has finished before noon, Mr. Schaffer said.
Id.
200. See generally Carp, Harris County Grand Jury, supra note 93.
201. Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert A. Carp, Associate Dean and Professor of
Political Science at the University of Houston (April 2, 1992) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview].
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check it from time to time. °2 However, Carp does not remember
any case coming to the grand jury from this source.03 In fact, Carp
received the clear impression that the district attorney seriously
discouraged use of this procedure, regarding it as an "end run"
around his office.204 Most importantly, Carp estimates that ninety-
nine percent of all criminal lawyers are unaware of their clients' rights
to approach the grand jury directly; ironically, even the two law
professors who sat on the grand jury with Carp had never heard of
this right.
20 5
2. Alabama.--Alabama's statutory scheme contains some support
for the right of a citizen to approach the grand jury directly, and
Alabama courts have interpreted this right liberally. The Alabama
grand jury is by statute a strong and independent investigative body.
For instance, the statute requires that any grand juror who knows or
suspects that a crime has been committed in the county to report that
crime to his fellow grand jurors, who then have a duty to investi-
gate.206 Furthermore, the grand jury is obligated "to inquire into all
indictable offenses committed or triable within the county."207
202. Id. "Any mail addressed to the grand jury will be given unopened to the foreman
.... Carp, Harris County GrandJuiy, supra note 93, at 106 (quoting C. Vance, The Harris
County Grand Jury 7 (undated), the grand jury handbook distributed to grand jurors by
the Harris County District Attorney).
203. Carp does recall a witness who appeared without being summoned by the grand
jury or the prosector although he appeared not to have used the grand jury mailbox.
Marvin Zindler was then a deputy sheriff who wanted the grand jury to investigate and
issue indictments concerning illegal gambling. The district attorney discouraged the grand
jury from hearing Zindler's testimony, but despite the discouragement, the jury spent
approximately ten to fifteen hours listening to Zindler. The grand jury voted indictments
for gambling but the prosecutor was reluctant to prosecute; he agreed to prosecute only
when the grand jury threatened to be less than totally cooperative with the district attorney
on the cases he submitted to them. Telephone Interview, supra note 201. Zindler,
incidentally, was subsequently fired from his job with the sheriff's office and became a
hugely successful consumer affairs reporter for a Houston television station. Later, it was
his crusade that led to the closing of the Chicken Ranch, the brothel writer Larry L. King
called The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas. J. Michael Kennedy, You Can't Miss Marvin, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at El. For an update on Zindler, see Allen R. Myerson, A Day with
Marvin Zindler: The Best Little Sideshow in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at Cl. Zindler's
appearance, style, and behavior are all outrageous. Kennedy, supra. Perhaps it takes a
special kind of moxie for a citizen to exercise his right to appear before the grand jury.
204. Telephone Interview, supra note 201; see also supra note 203.
205. Telephone Interview, supra note 201.
206. ALA. CODE § 12-16-206 (1986).
207. Id. § 12-16-192. Additionally, grand jurors must inspect the county jail personally,
and if it is inadequate, must indict the county commissioners responsible. Id. § 12-16-191.
The grand jury also has a duty to inquire into the fiscal affairs of the county. Id. § 12-16-
192. Similarly, the grand jury is mandated to inspect the books of the sheriff that contain
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The fact that Alabama grand juries possess broad investigative
powers serves as the basis for judicial interpretations of the statute as
permitting direct access to that body. These investigative powers
include subpoena authority: at the request of the grand jury, the
prosecutor, the jury foreman, or the clerk of the court must issue
subpoenas for witnesses.208  To supplement its fact-finding ability,
the grand jury has "free access, at all proper hours, to the county jail,
to the office of the county treasurer and to examination, without
charge, of all records and other papers in any of the county offices
connected in any way with [its] duties."29 Describing the breadth
of the grand jury's power, the Alabama Court of Appeals observed
"[w] hen the grand jury is so impaneled and sworn, it becomes the
supreme inquisitorial body of the county, and no preliminary act of
any court or judge can limit its powers. "210
On the basis of this investigative power, Alabama courts have laid
the foundation for permitting crime victims and witnesses to approach
the grand jury directly. The leading case, King v. Second National Bank
& Trust,211 arose as an action for malicious prosecution stemming
from a case of theft of lumber.212 The King appellee, Will Coleman,
had brought a theft to the attention of the grand jury, explaining that
he had been told who had committed the crime and providing the
names of witnesses. 3 The criminal defendants in the theft case
charged Coleman with malicious prosecution, but the court ruled that
his behavior was appropriate. The court observed that "[t]he law
favors the prosecution of crimes such as larceny" '14 and that
"[p] ublic policy demands that the citizen, without hazard to himself,
may freely bring before the grand jury the fact that a crime has been
committed, request an investigation, and furnish such information as
the "accounts with the state for feeding prisoners." Id. § 12-16-193. The grand jury, and
the district attorney, are also required to examine the fee book of the probate judge, id.
§ 12-16-194, and the superintendent of education. Id. § 12-16-195.
208. Id. § 12-16-197.
209. Id. § 12-16-196.
210. State v. Knighton, 108 So. 85 (Ala. Ct. App. 1926).
211. 173 So. 498 (Ala. 1937).
212. Id. at 499.
213. Id. Those whom Coleman accused of the theft were indicted by the grand jury but
later acquitted. Id. Although Coleman's testimony was chiefly hearsay, indictments may
rest on hearsay evidence in Alabama. State ex rel. Baxley v. Strawbridge, 296 So. 2d 779,
783 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 296 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 1974). This fact is significant
because it permits even those who were not eyewitnesses to a crime to approach the grand
jury and testify.
214. King, 173 So. 2d at 499.
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he has in aid of the investigation. "215
Once the victim or witness gets his case to the grand jury, is there
anything, other than the inherent powers of the court, to insure a
presentation that is fair to that person? Alabama law states:
Nor shall the circuit courts of this state be precluded from
utilizing any contempt powers or sanctions which may apply
to acts or events which violate the provisions of this division.
Further, the circuit judges of this state may issue whatever
other reasonable orders as may be necessary to accomplish
the purposes of this division.
21Z
Clearly, therefore, the circuit courtjudges are responsible for the
fairness of grand jury presentations and possess the tools to ensure
that fairness.
3. Louisiana.-The dominant influence that Louisiana district
attorneys exert over grand juries has been well documented. This
relationship is embedded within both the statutory law and the case
law of the state. As one commentator has described it, although the
Louisiana grand jury is legally an arm of the court, it "function [s]
merely, as a prosecutorial rubber stamp. "217 The grand jury is
incapable of excluding the district attorney from its sessions.218
Moreover, should the grand jury fail to render an indictment, the
district attorney may simply present the matter to another grand
jury.219
Although the grand jury is dominated in many ways by the
prosecutor, Louisiana case law makes it clear that a citizen also has a
215. Id. Furthermore, the court declared that it was unnecessary for the reporting
individual to be convinced that any of the parties are guilty or even have probable cause
of their guilt. Id.
Forty-four years later, Kingwas cited approvingly in Alabama Power Co. v. Neighbors,
402 So. 2d 958, 965-66 (Ala. 1981) (citing Kingfor the proposition that bringing a criminal
matter to the attention of a grand jury for purposes of initiating an investigation did not
constitute malicious prosecution).
216. ALA. CODE § 12-16-226 (1986).
217. Jerry Shropshire, Comment, The Louisiana GrandJury: Its Precarious Relationship with
the District Attorney, 6 S.U. L. REv. 151, 153 (1979); see also Mary A. Coffey & Joe B.
Norman, Comment, Selected Problems of the Louisiana Grand Jury, 52 TUL. L. REV. 707, 735
(1978) (finding that the educational standing and official position of the prosecutor may
serve to provide added power in manipulating the grand jury).
218. State ex rel. De Armas v. Platt, 192 So. 659, 670 (La. 1939).
219. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 386 ("The failure or refusal of a grand jury to
indict a defendant does not preclude a subsequent indictment by the same or another
grand jury, or the subsequent filing of an information or affidavit against him, for the
same offense.").
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right of direct access to the grand jury. In State v. Sullivan,"' for
example, the court ruled that members of the public were permitted
to appear before a grand jury to provide information or to seek an
indictment.22 The court held:
All that these [citizens] did... was to request permission to
see the members of the grand jury. The grand jury recessed
in order to receive them, and, upon the ladies being re-
ceived, they requested the grand jurors to investigate the
case, and, if the facts justified it, to take action thereon. We
see no reason, under these facts, to quash the bill. Any
person has a right to go before the grand jury and prefer a charge
against another.
222
There is some confusion over how the Louisiana grand jury
actually functions. As one commentator observed,
Notwithstanding that the district attorney is the center
of our criminal justice system, theoretically, the grand jury has
the power to open an investigation of any criminal matter
that comes to its attention. The district attorney may not
prevent it from considering charges by declaring that the
state will not prosecute. Though it cannot refuse his
admission to the proceedings, it need not accept his legal
advice, and can refuse to indict when it feels an indictment
is not warranted. The grand jury is also entitled to return
an indictment without the district attorney's consent or
approval; and the district attorney cannot direct the grand
jury to indict.22
Yet the same observer points out that the grand jury "normally hears
only those cases presented to it by the prosecutor, and only the
220. 105 So. 631 (La. 1925).
221. Id. at 633. It was not clear how the victim and her witnesses went about seeking
their audience with the grand jury. There was a dispute about whether the grand jury was
in session at the time, and whether they sought to bring about an indictment or only an
investigation. Id Nevertheless, the court found that "any person" may request and receive
a hearing. Id
222. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court also cited State v. Stewart, 14
So. 143 (La. 1893), approvingly. The defendant in Stewart "complained... that one S.A.
Morgan, the leading state witness, went without summons or request before the grand jury,
and gave his own version of the case against defendant, and instituted this prosecution."
Id. at 145. The court held that
It] he witness had the undoubted right to go before the grand jury voluntarily,
and disclose his knowledge of the case. As a good citizen, it was his duty to do
so. No one can be excused for withholding knowledge of a crime from the
public until he is summoned to give his testimony of its commission.
Id.
223. Shropshire, supra note 217, at 157 (citations omitted).
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prosecution's argument concerning those cases." 224 (On the other
hand, the trial judge in the Sullivan case opined that most criminal
prosecutions begin with citizens "talking matters over with" grand
22-jurors. 25) Restoring the Louisiana grand jury to its proper role,
according to the commentator, one must
relegate the prosecutor to an advisory role. Because most
grand jurors do not know the law, they should, upon
empanelment, be clearly advised as to what their duties are
and encouraged to investigate charges of crime or corrup-
tion without the district attorney telling them to do so. If the
grand jurors would actually take this advice, their initiative
and independence would be a needful requisite toward
restoring the grand jury to its former position as an impar-
tial investigative body, free of the district attorney's influ-
ence.
2 26
4. Georgia.--Grand juries in Georgia have the fundamental right
to decide whom to indict and for what offense, and grand jury
members are explicitly authorized to draw from a wide range of
sources of information, including prior personal knowledge of
crimes.227 The Georgia Supreme Court also has observed that "the
grand jury is not bound by the charge stated in the order of the
magistrate binding the defendant over. Nor are they bound by the
presentment of the district attorney. They must make a separate
determination as to what offenses have been committed."
2 1
Georgia grand juries have broad powers. They are required to
"inspect and examine .. .the receipts and disposition of all money
arising from fines and forfeitures" by the county school superinten-
dent, the county treasurer, the judge of the probate court, the district
attorney, and the clerk of the superior court. 229  Georgia grand
juries are also required to inspect county jails, making appropriate
224. Id. at 154-55.
225. State v. Sullivan, 105 So. 631, 633 (La. 1925).
226. Shropshire, supra note 217, at 170.
227. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-74 (Michie 1990). This section provides that:
Grand jurors have a duty to examine or make presentments of such offenses as
may or shall come to their knowledge or observation after they have been sworn.
Additionally, they have the right and power and it is their duty as jurors to make
presentments of any violations of the laws which they may know to have been
committed at any previous time which are not barred by the statute of limitations.
Id.
228. Johnson v. State, 251 S.E.2d 563, 565 (Ga. 1979).
229. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-75 (Michie 1990).
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recommendations for improvements, 20 public buildings, property,
and records.2 1' Georgia law also gives the grand jury the right to
appoint a single citizen or a committee of citizens to inspect the
books and records of county officials. The appointee(s), who report
back to the grand jury, have the "power to take full control" of these
offices and their records and to "compel the attendance of witnesses."
These powers are to be enforced by the superior court of the
county.2 2 In addition, upon a recommendation from a grand jury,
the court must publish the jury's presentments.2 3
This flexibility and independence naturally lends itself to a system
in which citizens are permitted direct access to the grand jury. In
fact, the court noted in In re Lester,234 that "it is the right of any
citizen or any individual of lawful age to come forward and prosecute
for offenses against the state, or when he does not wish to become
the prosecutor, he may give information of the fact to the grand jury
or any member of the body .... "5
Another feature of the Georgia grand jury system constitutes an
additional check on the prosecutor provided by the judiciary. The
Georgia legislature recently created "special purpose grand juries" that
can be convened if the chief judge of the superior court of any
county, or any elected official, requests the calling of such a grand
jury and the majority of superior court judges of the county ap-
prove.23 6 Because of the manner in which they are called, such
grand juries have a closer relationship with the judiciary than with the
prosecutor, unlike regular grand juries.237 The very fact that special
grand juries are more responsible to the judiciary than to the
prosecutor provides a healthy alternative to monopolistic prosecutorial
discretion and helps to ensure that citizen concerns will receive
238proper attention.
230. Id. § 15-12-78.
231. Id. § 15-12-79.
232. Id. § 15-12-76.
233. Id. § 15-12-80.
234. 77 Ga. 143 (1886).
235. Id at 148; see also Switzer v. State, 65 S.E. 1079, 1081 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) (noting
that special presentments can be made directly to the grand jury).
236. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-100 (Michie 1990).
237. Special grand juries file progress reports and a final report with the impaneling
judge. Moreover, it is the judges of the county who decide when the special purpose
grand jury has finished its work and should be disbanded. See id. § 15-12-101.
238. Whether the complainant can get a fair presentation before the grand jury from
a reluctant prosecutor is always a question. Fortunately, in Georgia, all grand jury
proceedings must be recorded, id. § 15-12-83, so a transcript is available forjudicial review.
Furthermore, the special purpose grand juries seem more responsive to judicial control
1994]
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5. Maryland.-The Maryland courts have perhaps analyzed the
issue of direct access to the grand jury in greater depth than the
other states in this section. In keeping with the common law,
Maryland permits the whistleblower, police brutality victim, or other
crime victim direct access to the foreperson of the grandjury-at least
after that victim or witness has exhausted other remedies such as
approaching the prosecutor and the committing magistrate. This
right of access derives from the wide-ranging power of the grand jury
to initiate investigations on its own and to gather information from all
sources, a power that was recognized early in Maryland's history.23 9
than to prosecutorial influence. But even as to regular grand juries, there are some
indications that the judiciary might not take its usual hands-off attitude toward the
prosecutor's presentation in the grand jury, based on the old rationale of separation of
powers. In In re Pending Cases, Augusta Judicial Circuit, 215 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. 1975), in
order to determine their court schedule, the judges of the Superior Court of the Augusta
Judicial Circuit asked the prosecutor's office for a list of cases pending in the district
attorney's office. The district attorney objected. Id. at 474. In ordering the information
turned over, the court said: "The separation of powers is fundamental to our constitution-
al form of government. However, it does not follow that a complete separation is desirable
or was intended. Most state constitutions blend these powers to a certain extent." Id. The
court continued:
The three departments of government are not kept wholly separate in the
Georgia Constitution. Such is the case here. Our Constitution requires district
attorneys "to perform such other services as shall be required of him by law." GA.
CONST. art. VI, § 11, para. 2. One of these statutory requirements is that district
attorneys are "otherwise to aid the presiding judge in organizing the courts as he
may require." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2908-3. District attorneys are also required
to prosecute all indictable offenses. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2908-4. They may not
nolle prosequi a case without the consent of the court. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1801.
In certain instances the presiding judge may appoint a special prosecutor or
.command the services of a district attorney of any other circuit accessible." GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-2913.
Id. at 474-75.
239. As early as 1891, the Maryland Court of Appeals observed that, because of its
inquisitorial power, the grand jury could initiate prosecutions on the basis of information
derived from sources other than the prosecutor. Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 156, 21 A.
547, 548 (1891).
However restricted the functions of grand juries may be elsewhere, we hold
that in this State they have plenary inquisitorial powers, and may lawfully
themselves, and upon their own motion, originate charges against offenders
though no preliminary proceedings have been had before a magistrate, and
though neither the court nor the State's Attorney has laid the matter before
them. The peace, the government and the dignity of the State, the well-being of
society and the security of the individual demand, that this ancient and important
attribute of a grand jury should not be narrowed or interfered with when
legitimately exerted.
Id. at 156, 21 A. at 548. Accord In re Report of Grand Jury, Appeal of Perring, 152 Md. 616,
621-22, 137 A. 370, 372 (1927); see also Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 570, 166 A. 45, 50
(1933) (noting that a grand jury is "permitted to act upon knowledge obtained by its
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In Brack v. Wells,2" the Maryland Court of Appeals made a clear
statement of Maryland law on this issue. In Brack, the appellant had
requested that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the state's
attorney to present a case of alleged barratry and perjury to the
Baltimore City grand jury. 4' The court declined to issue the writ
because Brack still had another remedy available to him:242
[Tihe petitioner is entitled [to] personally present[] his case
to the grand jury .... The members of the grand jury in
their oath prescribed by the common law, in addition to
other things, swore that they would diligently inquire and
true presentment make of all such matters and things as
shall be given them in charge or shall otherwise come to their
knowledge. The inquisitorial powers of the grand jury are not
limited to cases in which there has been a preliminary
proceeding before a magistrate nor to cases laid before them
by the Court or State's Attorney. Whatever may be the
duties and powers of that important body in other jurisdic-
tions, in Maryland those inquisitorial powers are broad, full
and of a plenary character .... Under these broad inquisi-
torial powers the grand jury may, of course, investigate a
case which the State's Attorney, in his discretion, has
decided not to present to that body. Upon the proper
functioning of the grand jury the lives, security, and property
of the people largely depend.243
On a motion for modification, the state's attorney argued that if
all citizens have a right to appear and present a case before the grand
jury, the grand jury's scarce resources will be expended on hearing
meritless claims.244 The court denied the prosecutor's motion,
explaining that its opinion should not be read as a means for avoiding
members from any source").
240. 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
241. Id. at 88-89, 40 A.2d at 320. Brack had presented the facts to a local magistrate,
who declined to take any action. He also had repeatedly presented the evidence to the
state's attorney, who persisted in his refusal to act upon Brack's complaint. Id at 89, 40
A.2d at 320. Brack's request for a writ of mandamus was denied by the trial court. Id
242. Id. at 90-91, 40 A.2d at 321.
243. Id. at 91-92, 40 A.2d at 321-22. The court, however, did not identify the procedure
by which this presentment should be made. See id. Quoting the United States Supreme
Court, the court merely wrote:
"But in this country [it] is for the grand jury to investigate any alleged crime, no
matter how or by whom suggested to them, and after determining that the
evidence is sufficient to justify putting the party suspected on trial, to direct the
preparation of the formal charge or indictment."
Id. at 95, 40 A.2d at 323 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 63 (1906)).
244. Id. at 92-93, 40 A.2d at 322.
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the traditional prosecutorial process. Rather, approaching the
foreman of the grand jury should be the last stage of appeal, 245 but
"every citizen has a right to offer to present to the grand jury
violations of the criminal law."246 The court pointed out that it was
illogical to have a grand jury to whom only the prosecutor has access,
for "[i]f the presentation of cases before the grand jury in Baltimore
City is controlled entirely by the state's attorney . . . the question
naturally arises as to why there should be a grand jury."247
6. Minnesota.-In State ex rel. Wild v. Otis,2 48 the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that a private citizen may not circumvent
the public prosecutor by initiating and prosecuting a private criminal
prosecution. 249 Because the citizen could not be the prosecutor, the
court outlined the courses of action that are available to the private
citizen when the prosecutor declines to prosecute, including direct
appeal to the grand jury.250  Though no affirmative "right" to
245. Id. at 97, 40 A.2d at 324 ("The citizen should exhaust his remedy before the
magistrate and state's attorney as was done in the instant case, and if relief can not be had
there, he then has the right to ask the foreman of the grand jury for permission to appear
before that body.").
246. Id.
247. Id. at 96-97, 40 A.2d at 324. Eleven years later the Maryland Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the principles of Brack v. Wells in Piracci v. State, 207 Md. 499, 515, 115 A.2d
262, 268 (1955) (recognizing a citizen's right to approach the grand jury when other
avenues had been exhausted).
248. 257 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978).
249. Id. at 363. Plaintiff Wild first tried to convince two county attorneys to approve
criminal complaints against defendants; then he attempted to convince the grand jury
directly to indict; and finally, he filed criminal complaints in an effort to prosecute as a
private citizen-all without success. Id. at 363, 364 n.1. See generally Davis, supra note 2.
250. Otis, 257 N.W.2d at 364-65. The other alternatives included: persuading a court
to appoint another attorney to act in place of the existing county attorney, id.; see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388-12 (West 1968) ("The judge of any district court may by order
entered in the minutes at any term of court appoint an attorney of such court to act as,
or in the place of, or to assist, the county attorney at such term, either before the court
or grand jury."); appealing to the governor to request that the prosecutor bring forth an
indictment, Otis, 257 N.W.2d at 364-65; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.01 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1994) (providing that "[w]henever the governor shall so request.... [the attorney
general] shall prosecute any person charged with an indictable offense"); and attempting
to force the prosecutor's hand by seeking a writ of mandamus. Otis, 257 N.W.2d at 364-65.
If a crime victim persuades the grand jury to hear his case, there are certain
safeguards in the system to ensure that the prosecutor, who is entitled to be present at
grand jury proceedings except for deliberations and voting, will allow a presentation of a
fair case. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.051 (West Supp. 1994) (detailing when the county
attorney shall appear before the grand jury and in what capacity). One safeguard against
prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury is that there is a record of it. The Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure state that all grand jury proceedings shall be recorded
verbatim, including any colloquy between the prosecutor and the grandjurors. MINN. R.
320
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appear before the grand jury exists in Minnesota, the local rules of
CRIM. P. § 18.05. Thus, if the prosecutor makes an improper statement that tends to
reduce the odds of securing an indictment, it will be on record and will enable the court
to monitor the fairness of the grand jury presentation both to the defendant and to the
victim. Id. For example, if a judge observes that the prosecutor engaged in behavior
unfair to the victim, the judge may vacate the proceedings and order a new presentation.
See id. § 18.07 ("The failure to find an indictment or the dismissal of the charge shall not
prevent the case from again being submitted to a grand jury as often as the court shall
direct.").
Historically, it has been the criminal defendant-not the victim-who has sought to
obtain a copy of grand jury minutes in order to show their inadequacy or unfairness. The
court may disclose the grand jury minutes to the defendant if the defense makes a showing
that there may have been irregularities in the grand jury proceeding. Section 18.05(1)
provides, in relevant part:
The [grandjuryl record shall not be disclosed except to the court or prosecuting
attorney or unless the court, upon motion by the defendant for good cause
shown, or upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury, orders disclosure
of the record or designated portions thereof to the defendant or defense counsel.
Id. § 18.05(1).
The Minnesotajudiciary has been extremely attentive to preserving the independence
of the grand jury. When prosecutors have overstepped the boundaries, Minnesota courts
have hastened to dismiss indictments. E.g., State v. Grose, 387 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (dismissing an indictment against an attorney for suborning perjury because
of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, including giving improper legal advice
and giving misleading instructions). One particularly telling example occurred in State
v.Johnson, 441 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1989), in which a four judge panel concluded that the
county attorney had subverted the independence of the grand jury by threatening to seek
out absent jurors and bring them back to the grand jury by police car, instructing the
grandjury to keep in mind his office's "higher" standard of probable cause, discussing trial
strategy, improperly instructing the jurors on probable cause, and asking the jurors not
to "overwhelm him with charges." Id. at 464-65. There were other errors as well that
ultimately lead the appellate court to disagree with the panel's holding of harmless error.
Id. at 464-66.
The errors in this case, although not of the magnitude in Grose, justify the same
result. Threatening members of the grand jury that they could be picked up by
police, handing out instructions from previous grand jurors, and giving
inaccurate instructions on probable cause and the effect of a failure to indict are
the types of errors that seriously undermine the integrity and independence of
the grand jury.
Prosecutors must not take advantage of their role as representatives of the
state to influence unduly or unfairly a grand jury's decision.
The grand jury is not intended to be a tool of the prosecution or the defense. It is an
arm of the judiciary and, as such, it shall be used in a fair, impartial and independent
manner or not at all. This decision is necessary to protect not only the defendants, but all
of us as well.
Id. (emphasis added). The language in the final paragraph of the above quote-"all of
us as well"-indicates both that the court is serious about the grand jury maintaining its
independence and that the court is determined to make sure that grand jury presentations
are fair to defendants and victims alike.
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criminal procedure permit it.25 ' Additionally, the court noted,
"permitting citizens to take complaints directly to this body serves as
a kind of 'safety valve' and has much to commend it. 252
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in Otis stopped short of
finding that a private citizen has a "right" to approach the grand jury
directly,253 Minnesota case law clearly recognizes that the public
prosecutor does not have a monopoly on the initiation of criminal
prosecutions.254 In order for the grand jury and the prosecutor to
serve as effective checks on one another, the average citizen must
have access to the grand jury. Understandably, then, the Minnesota
statutory structure consistently has supported the judiciary's view of a
strong, independent grand jury.255  Specifically, Minnesota statutes
provide that " [i]f a member of the grand jury shall know or have
reason to believe that a public offense has been committed which is
triable in the county, he shall declare the same to his fellow jurors,
who shall thereupon investigate the same. "256 Moreover, the grand
jury is obligated to inquire into the condition of unindicted prisoners,
into the status and administration of prisons within the county, and
"[i]nto the wilful and corrupt misconduct in office of all public
officers in the county. "257 The misconduct of all "public
officers"-including police officers-is the responsibility of the grand
jury to ferret out. This task is made easier, no doubt, by the fact that
the grand jury is also permitted access to the prisons and to "all
public records in the county."25 8  With these broad powers, the
grand jury represents an even more important check on prosecutorial
misconduct and a source of redress for citizens who are victims or
witnesses to governmental misconduct, including police brutality.
B. States Authorizing Direct Access to the Grand Jury by Statute
There are four states which have enacted legislation allowing
crime victims and witnesses direct access to the grandjury: California,
Tennessee, Colorado, and Nebraska.
251. Otis, 257 N.W.2d at 364.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See supra note 250 and cases cited therein.
255. Otis, 257 N.W.2d at 364; see also Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 193 N.W.2d
139, 143 (Minn. 1971) (holding that the grand jury "has investigatory powers, including
the power to investigate on its own initiative situations where it has reason to believe a
public offense has been committed"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
256. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.60 (West 1993).
257. Id. § 628.61.
258. Id. § 628.62.
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1. California.-California's elaborate statutory scheme creates an
extremely powerful grandjury. Not only does the grand jury have the
power to "inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within
the county and present them to the court by indictment,"259 but it
also has its own preapproved budget for investigative activities260 and
can select its own method of proceeding.261 Under appropriate
circumstances, the grand jury may even hold public sessions.262
Furthermore, California grand juries may investigate county, city,
district, and housing affairs, 2" as well as all real estate transac-
tions.26 They have free access to prisons and may, without charge,
inspect any public record in the county.265
Grand juries may investigate and report on the salaries of elected
county officials 2ta and the needs of county officers. 26' They may
review the case of any unindicted prisoner who is languishing in the
county jail,26' and they may oversee the conditions and management
of the county prisons. 69 Perhaps most importantly, "[the grand
jury shall inquire into the willful or corrupt misconduct in office of
public officers of every description within the county. 270 To carry
out these inquiries, the grand jury may retain the services of various
experts,271 including auditors and appraisers. 2
Although these powers are expansive, the California grand jury
has yet another powerful weapon at its disposal: the accusation.
2 73
The grand jury may make an accusation in writing against any public
259. CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (West 1985); see also Samish v. Superior Court, 83 P.2d
305, 306-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that when grand jurors have reliable
information indicating that an indictable offense has been committed, it is their duty to
investigate the charges fairly and fearlessly and if the evidence warrants, to issue an indict-
ment).
260. CAL. PENAL CODE § 914.5 (West 1985).
261. Id. § 916.
262. Id. § 939.1.
263. Id. § 914.1.
264. Id. § 920 (including the direction of escheat proceedings).
265. Id. § 921.
266. Id. § 927.
267. Id. § 928.
268. Id. § 919(a).
269. Id. § 919(b).
270. Id. § 919(c). Interestingly, a person is incompetent to sit on a grand jury in
California if he or she is an elected public official. Id. § 893(b) (4).
271. Id. § 926(a).
272. Id. § 926(b).
273. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3060 (West 1980).
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officer for willful or corrupt misconduct in office.274 If the official
pleads "not guilty" to the accusation, then a jury trial similar to a
criminal trial is conducted.2 75  Further, conviction at the trial or a
guilty plea will result in the officer's removal from office.276
A recent charge to the grand jury of Los Angeles County, given
by Supervising Judge Klausner for the Criminal Division of the Los
Angeles Superior Court, illustrates the qualities and the potential
power of a California grand jury.2 77  Pertinent to the issue of
whether citizens may approach the grand jury directly, the judge's
charge emphasized that the grand jury is an independent body,278
and that as "the direct successor of the common law grand jury," the
body serves both as "a safety valve" and as an opportunity for citizens
to monitor governmental agents "which appear to be destructive of
274. Id At least 12 of the grand jurors must concur before that body can issue the
accusation.
275. Id. §§ 3069-70.
276. Id. § 3072.
277. Gary Klausner, Charge to the GrandJury (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter KlausnerJury
Charge] (on file with the author). The charge is composed of a cover page, a three-page
table of contents, a one-page oath to be taken by the jurors (required by CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 911 (West 1985)), a five-page charge to the grand jury, a thirty-four page description of
the history, role, and procedures of the grand jury, followed by seventeen pages of
pertinent California statutes.
The procedure section, which goes into exhaustive detail, explains how California
grand juries are divided into committees.
It is suggested that you form committees for the preliminary consideration of
matters in the various fields of activity in which you will function. Regarding
committees for the expeditious handling of the business of the grand jury, the






e. Juvenile and/or Elderly Concerns
f. Education
g. Social Services
h. Health and Hospital
i. Environmental Concerns
j. Editorial
You may change, modify, or add to the committees suggested above, and you may
authorize the appointment of any additional or special committees that may seem
necessary for you to carry out the work of the grand jury. The audit, criminal
complaints, and jails committees are considered essential by most grand juries
because of your mandates to audit the county, examine criminal complaints, and
inspect the jails.
Klausner, Jury Charge, supra, at 3-4.
278. Id. at 1.
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our social order."279
Furthermore, Judge Klausner's charge discussed the proper
relationship between the district attorney and the grand jury.2 °
Among his other duties, the district attorney must help the jurors
evaluate citizen complaints received by mail, and must suggest other
avenues of redress, if appropriate. Regarding these citizen com-
plaints, the judge wrote, "Some [of these claims] may result in
disclosure of offenses that would not otherwise have been brought to
light. When you obtain information indicating an offense or
misconduct within your jurisdiction, it is [the grand jury's] duty to
take appropriate action."281
Nevertheless, although the law clearly permits it, California grand
juries rarely have instigated investigations or indictments on the basis
of direct citizen complaints.2 82 In fact, almost all of the cases
examined by California grand juries have been brought by district
attorneys. 3
2. Tennessee.-Tennessee case law makes it clear that the grand
jury is an arm of neither the court nor the prosecutor's office; rather,
it exists as a separate agency of government that may act independent-
ly of either.284 Tennessee law expressly protects the grand jury from
prosecutorial dominance: the prosecutor may attend grand jury
proceedings only at the request of that body.285 In addition, the
judge is required to inform the grand jury expressly of this fact.286
279. Id. at IV.
280. Id. at 5-7.
281. Id. at 13-14. Interestingly, the charge emphasized that a very small percentage of
these private claims would be deserving of their attention. Id, at 13.
282. Karl Kinaga & Robert F. Jordan, Some Limitations and Controls of the California Grand
Jury System, 2 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 78 (1962).
283. Norbert Ehrenfreund et al., Report of the Grand Jury Committee, San Diego County Bar
Association, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 145, 156 (1972).
284. "It is incontestable, therefore, that the inquisitorial function and power of the
Grand Jury derive directly from our State Constitution itself and are grounded therein."
State v. Hudson, 487 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). E.g., Stanley v. State, 104
S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tenn. 1937) ("The grand jury is not an agency of the district attorney
or of the court. Under our system, it is an agency of the government and may act
independently of the court and district attorney."); Parton v. State, 455 S.W.2d 645, 647
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (citing Stanley with approval); State v. Marks, 464 S.W.2d 326, 328
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (citing Parton and Stanley).
285. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-501 (1981) ("Whenever required by the grand jury, the
district attorney general or his designated assistant may attend before that body for the
purpose of assisting in its inquiries, which assistance may include the examination of
witnesses and the giving of legal advice as to any matters cognizable by that body...
286. Id § 8-7-503.
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 53:271
As in other states, Tennessee empowers its grand juries to inquire
into the conditions of prisons and other public buildings, 2 7 the
county treasury, 288 the sufficiency of local bonds,289 and any mis-
conduct by state or local officers.290 The Tennessee statute also
allows both crime victims and witnesses direct access to the grand
jury.-  The legislature enacted this provision specifically to provide
the general public greater access to, and more information about, the
grand jury.292
The Tennessee grand jury process begins when the court clerk
publishes notices in local newspapers stating that it is the responsibili-
ty of the grand jurors to inquire into any indictable offense commit-
ted in the county.293 Anyone with knowledge of an offense may
apply for permission to appear before the grand jury;294 testimony
is given under oath, and rendering false statements to the grand jury
constitutes perjury.295  An application to testify must be submitted
to the foreman accompanied by a sworn affidavit of the facts or a
summary of the proof alleged.296 The affidavits provide a logical
method by which the grand jury can sort out the petty and false
complaints from the genuine reports of crime and victimization. The
applicant may select two grand jurors who, with the foreman, will
constitute a panel that will rule on whether the application merits
287. TENN. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3).
288. Id. R. 6(e)(4).
289. Id. R. 6(e)(5).
290. Id. R. 6(e)(6).
291. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-12-104 to -105 (1978). Actually, direct access to the grand
jury theoretically is available notjust to eyewitnesses and victims but also to those who have
hearsay knowledge of a crime. Waugh v. State, 564 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tenn. 1978); State
v. Grady, 619 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Gammon v. State, 506 S.W.2d 188, 190
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Marks, 464 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970);
Parton v. State, 455 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
292. Tape of Representative Bussart, remarks before the 90th Tennessee General
Assembly (Mar. 9, 1978) (audiotape H-122) (on file with the author and with the
Legislative History Staff, State Library and Archives, Department of State, State of
Tennessee). See also State v. Crane, 780 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (stating
that the purpose of this act is to provide greater access to the grand jury by "aggrieved
citizens," as well as to restore victims' faith in the criminal justice system), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 906 (1990). The legislation was a compromise bill, used to head off a competing bill
that would have established a citizen's review panel for police misconduct. Tape of
Representative Bussart, remarks before the 90th Tennessee General Assembly, supra.
293. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-12-105 (1978). The notice is to be published 30 to 40 days
prior to the grand jury's scheduled date to convene. Id
294. Id. The notice provides the foreman's name and address and the date and place
of the next meeting of the grand jury. Id.
295. Id. § 40-12-104(d).
296. Id § 40-12-104(a)-(b).
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investigation by the entire grand jury.297 There is some confusion
concerning how an applicant can discover the names of two other
grand jurors besides the foreman,"8 but the simple fact that the
applicant can choose the panel that will review his or her application
is itself a remarkable example of populism.2 The panel's decision
on the application is final"° and is reported promptly to the appli-
cant with the reasons for the decision." 1 That the foreman should
serve on all panels may seem an inefficient way to proceed; on the
other hand, perhaps the frequency with which the foreman must
make decisions on applications will enable him or her to better
withstand intimidation by the prosecutor or the court.30 2
In sum, in Tennessee, "no one may prevent a person from
appearing before a grand jury. Indeed, it is his duty to do so if he has
evidence of a crime." 3°s In reality, however, few citizens submit
297. Id. § 40-12-104(c). In making the determination whether the grand jury should
hear the applicant's case, the panel may consult with the prosecutor or the court. These
outside sources of information may provide the panel with background information or
broader perspective on why no action was taken previously. See also supra notes 285-286
and accompanying text.
298. This confusion arguably is the result of legislative oversight. The original bill
required that the newspaper notice list both the foreman and the other members of the
grand jury. During consideration of the bill, however, it was pointed out that one could
not list the grand jurors one month ahead of time because they frequently were not
selected until the day on which the grand jury convened. Consequently, the House
deleted the requirement. Tennessee Senate Consent Calendar, March 22, 1978, at 2
(describing Senate Bill 2059 and House Bill 2149). The legislature apparently neglected
to revise § 40-12-104(c) to reflect the fact that the applicant could not select two members
of that grand jury until after the jury actually was impaneled.
299. In reality, the legislative intent may be frustrated by tactics such as those that
occurred in Gann v. Whitley (In re Reed), 770 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989),
in which the foreman of the grand jury created a panel comprised of himself, the two
jurors selected by the applicant, and two additional jurors the foreman had chosen. Id.
at 559. If the foreman is permitted to add two jurors of his own choice to the panel,
potentially shifting the alignment against the applicant, then the result, as in Gann, may
be a denial of the application. See id
300. Gann, 770 S.W.2d at 560-61.
301. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-12-104(c) (1978).
302. It can be valuable to have a more seasoned leader on the grand jury because many
grand jurors are intimidated by the technicalities of the judicial process. Thus, "they
look[] to the more mature members of the grand jury to represent them in their
confrontations with the district attorney." Carp, Harris County Grand Jury, supra note 93,
at 96-97 (discussing juror attitudes in Harris County, Texas).
303. Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd. For Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 1980)
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court upheld the dismissal of a police officer who
had been fired after appearing before a grand jury because the court believed he was
dismissed for other reasons. Chief Justice Brock agreed with the court's sentiments
concerning the right to appear before a grand jury, but dissented from the majority's
application of those rights in the case of a self-styled "Ralph Nader" of the Columbia,
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applications, either for fear of retaliation or repercussions from
offering testimony, or out of apathy, helplessness, or ignorance. 4
3. Colorado.--One of the explicit purposes of the Colorado Code
of Criminal Procedure is "the effective apprehension and trial of
persons accused of crime .... ."0 To satisfy this goal, Colorado law
provides-in the broadest language-that any person who wants to
appear or testify may have access to the grand jury, the district
attorney, and the court. 6
Tennessee police force:
Stripped of the protective verbiage surrounding it, the plain truth is that the
plaintiff was fired because he testified before a grand jury in violation of an
ultimatum from the Chief of Police that he not do so.
This attempted "gag order" is invalid, however, for a different reason, i.e.,
every citizen has access to testify before the grand jury in this state. Any attempt
to cut off that access is against public policy. The grand jury may act by
presentment as well as indictment. It is absolutely intolerable in a free society
that any public employee may be forbidden to go before a grand jury and give
testimony of facts within his knowledge respecting criminal offenses. Police
officers sometimes become aware of criminal offenses committed by other police
officers or their superiors, or their civilian cronies. When this occurs, is the
officer to run the risk of losing his employment if he testified before the grand
jury with respect to such offenses in spite of a "gag order" such as the one here?
Let us hope not.
Id. at 284-85 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
304. Cases such as Watts are likely to chill the exercise of such rights despite the stirring
dissents of judges.
305. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-103 (West 1986).
306. Section 16-5-204(4) (1) states:
Any person may approach the prosecuting attorney or the grand jury and
request to testify or retestify in an inquiry before a grand jury or to appear before
a grand jury. The prosecuting attorney or the grand jury shall keep a record of
all denials of such requests to that prosecuting attorney or grand jury, including
the reasons for not allowing such person to testify or appear. If the person
making such request is dissatisfied with the decision of the prosecuting attorney
or the grand jury, such person may petition the court for hearing on the denial
by the prosecuting attorney or the grand jury. If the court grants the hearing,
then the court may permit the person to testify or appear before the grand jury,
if the court finds that such testimony or appearance would serve the interest of
justice.
Id.
The Colorado Constitution buttresses the attitude of openness toward the grand jury
embodied in the above quoted statute. Article II, § 24, entitled "Right to assemble and
petition," states that "[t]he people have the right peaceably to assemble for the common
good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of
grievances, by petition or remonstrance." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 24. The petition clause
of this section has been interpreted as specifically granting Colorado citizens a ight of
access to the courts. Protect Our Mountain Env't Inc., v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361,
1365 (Colo. 1984). Article II, § 6 declares that "[c]ourts ofjustice shall be open to every
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In effect, the grand jury statute gives the victim or witness three
bites at the apple. A crime victim may approach the district attorney
and request a prosecution." 7 If the prosecutor refuses to prosecute,
the victim may ask the grand jury to hear his or her testimony and to
conduct an investigation."' Both the district attorney and the
grand jury must keep a record of denials of such requests, including
the reasons for their denial."°  Finally, if the victim is unsatisfied
with the district attorney's or the grand jury's decision, he or she can
petition the court to order the grand jury to allow the victim to testify
before it.31 The court's determination is based upon whether the
"testimony or appearance would serve the interest of justice."31'
Because hearsay evidence is admissible at a preliminary hearing
in Colorado,31 it follows that such evidence is admissible before the
grand jury. Thus, the phrase "any person" in section 16-5-204(4) (1)
would not appear to prohibit someone who has only hearsay evidence
to offer from appearing before the grand jury. Furthermore, by
permitting the citizen to "approach the prosecuting attorney or the
grand jury" this section empowers the applicant to approach both the
grand jury and the prosecutor, as necessary. The statute, however,
does not provide a mechanism by which the applicant may contact
the grand jury. Similarly, although the second sentence of this
section mandates that "[t] he prosecuting attorney or the grand jury
shall keep a record of all denials of such requests to [testify or appear
made to] that prosecuting attorney or grand jury, including the
reasons for not allowing such persons to testify or appear,"313 the
person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character;
and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay." COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 6.
307. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4) (1) (West 1986).
308. Id. The grand jury may petition the court to appoint an investigator to assist the
grand jury, and the investigator may attend the sessions of the grandjury. COLO. R. CRIM.
P. 6.5.
309. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4) (1) (West 1986). The statute does not specify
in what manner these records are to be kept, how detailed they must be, or whether they
are available to the public. Similarly, nothing in the statute forbids or mandates the
keeping of records of successful applications to testify. If one wished to know how this
statute was working, one would want to know the details of both successful and
unsuccessful applications.
310. H.Jeffrey Bayless, Grand Juiy Reforms: The Colorado Experience, 67 A.B.A.J. 568, 570
(1981).
311. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(1) (West 1986); see also Bayless, supra note
310, at 570. The grand jury also may issue an indictment based on the knowledge of two
of its members. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6(b).
312. People v. Quinn, 516 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1973).
313. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4) (1) (West 1986).
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statute does not specify in what manner these records are to be kept,
how detailed they must be, or whether they are available to the
public. It is also noteworthy that the statute fails to specify the form
of the petition and of the "hearing" this section guarantees to
petitioners whose request is denied. 14
Even a merely "dissatisfied" applicant may "petition the court for
hearing" under this section 315 if that applicant's appearance is so
constricted by the prosecutor that the prosecutor's restriction could
constitute a de facto denial of a "hearing."316 Neither the court nor
the grand jury may exclude the district attorney from their proceed-
314. An interpretation of the word "hearing" arose in an unrelated, but analogous,
context. In Moody v. Larsen, 802 P.2d 1169 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) the Colorado Court of
Appeals construed the word "hearing" in § 16-5-209 to provide:
The convening of a hearing presupposes that evidence will be introduced during
such proceeding. "The word ['hearing'] contemplates not only the privilege to
be present when the matter is being considered but [also] the right to present
one's contention and to support the same by proof and argument." ...
[W]e conclude that § 16-5-209 calls for the usual type of hearing in which
both parties are given the opportunity to present evidence and argument.
Id. at 1171 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 422 P.2d 634 (1967)).
In Moody, the complainant, the sister of a murder victim, invoked this section in an
attempt to have the judge direct the district attorney either to prosecute or to order the
appointment of a special prosecutor. In a ruling for the complainant, the court
interpreted the word "hearing" in the statute to require that the complainant be allowed
to present her own witnesses and rebuttal witnesses. In addition to the right to cross-
examine the District Attorney, the court found that the complainant should have had the
right to pretrial discovery. Id. at 1171-73.
315. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(1) (West 1986).
316. Additional safeguards ensure that the prosecutor's presentation to the grand jury
will be fair and objective. For example, all grand jury proceedings are recorded. Id § 16-
5-204(f) ("All grandjury proceedings and testimony from commencement to adjournment
shall be reported."); COLO. R. CRiM. P. 6.4. The court can entertain a motion by the
defense to inspect the record and dismiss an indictment if it is not supported by probable
cause. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4) (k) (West 1986). Even the colloquy between
the grand jurors and the prosecutor may be provided to the defense counsel under proper
circumstances. People v. District Court, 610 P.2d 490, 493 (Colo. 1980). In addition, a
specific provision exists under the Colorado rules of procedure that permits a grand jury
witness, including the victim or complainant, "for good cause shown," to obtain "a
transcript of his own grand jury testimony, or minutes, reports, or exhibits relating to
them." COLO. R. CRiM. P. 6.9.
Another powerful tool within the grand jury access law for ensuring a fair grand jury
presentation by the prosecutor is the provision under which an applicant may request to
retestify in an inquiry before a grand jury. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4) (1) (West
1986). Because the court must determine whether to permit the person to retestify before
the grand jury, the court would have to inspect the minutes of the grand jury proceeding,
the applicant's prior testimony in particular, to see if retestifying is warranted. Regular
applications to retestify would force the court to monitor the fairness of the prosecutor's
original presentations. Cf supra note 250 (discussing safeguards on the fairness of grand
jury presentations in Minnesota).
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ings " 7 Therefore, protections against a potentially overreaching
prosecutor are warranted.
Finally, the statute's concluding sentence leaves room for
interpretation: "If the court grants the hearing, then the court may
permit the person to testify or appear before the grand jury, if the
court finds that such testimony or appearance would serve the interest
of justice."31 No explanation or definition of "the interest of
justice" is provided, but giving an alleged victim of either police
brutality or other governmental misconduct a right to be heard
should come within the purview of such a sweeping proviso. This is
especially true in light of the fact that the complainant can be held
liable for all costs of the proceeding if the complaint is false and
frivolous. There is thus a strong disincentive to bring false com-
plaints.1 9
Notwithstanding the sophistication of Colorado's grand jury
statute, that remedy for injustice is greatly underutilized:
The vast majority of prosecutions in Colorado are initiated
by information. Only counties with a population of more
than 100,000 have a regularly selected standing grand jury.
Special grand juries may, of course, be selected for smaller
jurisdictions upon proper motion, but that is a rare occur-
rence. There are generally only a handful of regularly
sitting grand juries in Colorado, and the indictment is
utilized in less than 1 per cent of all felony cases filed in the
state.
3 20
The decision to use the grand jury so sparingly is a decision made by
the public prosecutors in the state. This underutilization of the grand
jury is another reason why citizens who are victims of police criminali-
ty, governmental corruption, or even other, more mundane crimes
should invoke Colorado law to bring their complaints to the attention
of grand juries. Where grand juries are not in session, citizens may
apply to the chief judge of the local district court for the convening
317. See People ex reL District Attorney v. District Court, 205 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1924)
(construing a prior similar grand jury statute, Colorado Laws § 5979 (1921), and
concluding that the grand jury could not exclude the district attorney when he was
examining a witness); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-106 (West 1986) (providing
that the district attorney must attend all sessions of the grand jury, advise the jurors on the
law, and examine all subpoenaed witnesses).
318. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(1) (West 1986).
319. Md § 16-18-103; see also id, § 16-18-104 (providing that if the applicant later fails to
provide testimony at trial, or is found to have brought the proceedings "maliciously," the
applicant will pay the cost of the proceedings).
320. Bayless, supra note 310, at 572.
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of a grand jury. The chief judge of any district court is entitled to
order a grand jury called "where authorized by law or required by the
public interest. "321
4. Nebraska. -Nebraska's system of citizen access to the grand
jury is virtually identical to that of Colorado. Indeed, the key section,
which permits a citizen who wants to appear or testify before the
grand jury to apply to the prosecutor, the grand jury, and the court,
is identical.322 As a result, much of the analysis of Colorado's system
also is applicable to Nebraska's scheme and will not be repeated here
at length.
As in Colorado, all grand jury proceedings in Nebraska are
recorded.323 Thus, the Nebraska courts may examine the minutes
of a grand jury proceeding to determine whether an indictment
should be dismissed for lack of probable cause.324 In addition, a
witness/complainant who testifies before the grand jury may apply to
the court to review a transcript of his or her testimony in order to
show unfairness or improper influence by the prosecutor.325 More-
over, as in Colorado,3 26 a person who has appeared before the
grand jury may file an application to "retestify" pursuant to section
29-1410.01 of the Nebraska Code.327 If the application to retestify
321. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) ("The chief judge of the district court in each county or
a judge designated by him may order a grand jury summoned where authorized by law or
required by the public interest.").
322. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1410.01 (1989). The only difference is the addition of the
letter "s" on the end of the word "interest," in the clause "interests ofjustice."
At the time of its proposal, discussion over the derivation of the bill's language
partially revealed its Coloradan origin. Public Hearing on LB 534, Comm. on the Judiciary,
Nebraska State Legislature 52 (Feb. 13, 1979) (statement of Senator Ernie Chambers
[hereinafter Public Hearings]; cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-204(4) (1) (West 1986); see supra
note 306.
323. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1407.01 (1989); cf COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(f)
(West 1986); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.4; see also supra note 316 (discussing the use of the
recording requirement in Colorado's statute to ensure fairness in prosecutorial grand jury
presentations).
324. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1418(3) (1989); cf. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(k)
(West 1986).
325. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1407.01(2) (1989); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4) (g)
(West 1986).
326. See supra note 316 (discussing the option to "retestify" within the Colorado
statutory scheme).
327.
Any person may approach the prosecuting attorney or the grandjury and request
to ... retestify .... If the person making [a] request [to retestify] is dissatisfied
with the decision of the prosecuting attorney or the grand jury, such person may
petition the court for hearing on the denial by the prosecuting attorney or the
grand jury. If the court grants the hearing, then the court may permit the
332
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is denied by the prosecutor and the grand jury, the court can review
the grand jury transcript to determine whether retestifying is
warranted in the "interests of justice.""32  Although one might
logically expect that the application to retestify would become the
normal vehicle by which to have the court determine whether the
prosecutor's initial presentation to the grand jury was objective and
fair toward the victim, section 29-1416(2) presents a potential problem
in utilizing the statute in this manner:
Once a grand jury has returned a no true bill based upon a
transaction, a set of transactions, event, or events, a grand
jury inquiry into the same transaction or events shall not be
initiated unless the court finds, upon proper showing by the
prosecuting attorney, that the prosecuting attorney has discovered
additional evidence relevant to such inquiry.29
It is unclear how a Nebraska court would attempt to reconcile sections
29-1410.01 and 29-1416(2) when a person applied to retestify.3"' In
any case, this last section does not affect the initial application to
testify before the grand jury.
In addition to the safeguards adopted from the Colorado grand
jury law, Nebraskans have another statutory weapon to address cases
of official misconduct. By statute, the county attorney may always
appear before the grand jury to render legal advice and examine
witnesses.3" When it becomes evident that "official acts of county
officials" are to be investigated, however, the foreman of the grand
jury must immediately contact the governor, who must appoint a
special prosecutor for the matter. 2 This section provides a power-
person to testify or appear before the grand jury if the court finds that such
testimony or appearance would serve the interests of justice.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1410.01 (1989).
328. Id.
329. Id. § 29-1416(2) (1989) (emphasis added). It is unclear whether this applies to the
grand jury that voted the no true bill or to subsequent grand juries only.
330. Perhaps the witness would have to submit his application to retestify before the
grand jury returned a no true bill.
331. Id. § 29-1408.
332. Id. The relevant portion of this section reads:
[W] henever it shall be made to appear to the judge orjudges of the district court
that investigation should be made regarding official acts of county officials, the
foreman shall forthwith notify the Governor of the state, who shall forthwith
appoint a special prosecutor to appear and act in the place of the county attorney
or the assistant county attorney in all matters relating thereto before such grand
jury in like manner as though county attorney; and the county attorney or the
assistant county attorney shall be excluded from the presence of the grand jury
during all proceedings which relate to the subject matter for which the special
prosecutor was appointed ....
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ful mechanism by which a citizen can bring a case of official miscon-
duct before a grand jury and have a special prosecutor appointed to
investigate and prosecute. Although what constitutes "official acts of
county officials" is not entirely clear, this category would seem to
include police brutality and criminality.
Grand juries are relatively rare in Nebraska. 333  Although this
undoubtedly presents a significant barrier, the hurdle is not necessari-
ly an insurmountable one because the Nebraska legislature has also
provided a method for requiring the district courts to call a grand jury
upon the petition of a certain percentage of voters.3 4 If the judge
fails to assess the sufficiency of the petition or fails to convene the
grand jury within the time set forth by statute, the clerk of court must
immediately call the grand jury.335 If the judge and the clerk of
court both fail to convene the grand jury, the petitioners may request
that the chief justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court review their
petition and impanel a grand jury.336
Nebraskans have used this petition power several times in recent
years. When the state's largest industrial finance and loan institution
became insolvent in 1983, a group of citizens formed the Nebraska
Depositors Action Committee and called for a grand jury investiga-
tion.3' The Committee submitted more than ten thousand signa-
tures.33 At other times the mere threat of a grand jury investiga-
tion was sufficient. For example, in 1986, the Bellevue, Nebraska, city
administrator-who had held that post for more than a decade-
indicated his intention to resign in the face of a mounting petition
drive.339 "The resignation reports came on the heels of a disagree-
Id. (emphasis added).
333. See Public Hearings, supra note 322, at 53 (colloquy between Senators Nichol and
Chambers); see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1401 (1989) (giving district court judges the
power to impanel a grand jury when the "court may deem necessary").
334.
It shall be mandatory for such district courts to call a grand jury in each case
upon the petition of the registered voters of the county of the number of not less
than ten per cent of the total vote cast for the office of Governor in such county
at the most recent general election held therein for such office.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1401 (1989). The statute sets out the precise format for the petition,
id. § 29-1401.01, and an extraordinarily complicated procedure for its filing. Id, § 29-
1401.02..
335. Id. § 29-1401.02(7). The statute permits the judge 15 days in which to call the
grand jury. Id.
336. Id. § 29-1401.02(8).
337. Committee Files Petitions For Commonwealth Investigation, UPI, Mar. 1, 1984, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
338. Id.
339. Regional News, UPI, May 29, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
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ment over city council expenses and a resulting petition drive that
[sought] a grand jury investigation. " "
Perhaps the best-known Nebraska case involving petitioning for
a grand jury occurred in the case of the disappearance of Joyce
Cutshall's nine-year-old daughter Jill in August 1987."4' After a long
police investigation, the police placed her daughter's case on "semi-
active" status. 42  Cutshall was "outraged.3 43  Volunteers organized
and gathered signatures.344 The grand jury indicted a man who was
ultimately convicted of one count of kidnapping with intent to
sexually assault a child. 45
This grand jury petitioning statute was also applied directly in an
instance of police brutality, but with only mixed results. Richard
Kellin, a thirty-five-year-old African-American man, died of a skull
fracture after being arrested for disorderly conduct and having an
altercation with Omaha police officers in the jail detention area. 46
An internal police investigation cleared the officers involved; 347 the
Douglas County Attorney's office reviewed the case and found no
evidence of police wrongdoing.3 48 As a result, a watchdog coalition
of African-Americans in Omaha circulated petitions in an attempt to
convene a grand jury. Unofficial results indicated that the drive had
accumulated the requisite number of valid signatures, with a surplus
of 358 names.3 49  In January 1987, the district court approved the
petition and summoned grand jurors.35' Although the grand jury
340. Id.
341. Sharon Cohen, A Mother's Mission: Ghost of Death Haunts Search For Daughter, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, at A4.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at A33.
In December, while others shopped for Christmas gifts, Uoyce Cutshall]
collected signatures. While the local mall was being decorated, she was setting
up a table and banner reading: "Jill Cutshall Needs a Grand Jury."
A dozen volunteers gathered signatures at the mall and braved blizzards to
collect more in door-to-door visits. Petitions were presented to authorities on
Feb. 20-the day after Jill's birthday-"my gift to her," her mother says.
Authorities, she says, certified 1471 signatures, hundreds more than needed.
Id.
345. Man Guilty; Missing Girl a Mystery, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1991, at C8.




349. Kellin Death May Be Investigated By Citizens, UPI, Dec. 30, 1986, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
350. Judge Summons Grand Jurors In Black's Death, UPI,Jan. 16, 1987, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
investigation resulted in no indictments, the grand jury did issue
twenty-three recommendations for improvements in police administra-
tion, training, and physical plant."s ' Another positive result of the
incident was that Senator Chambers, who had introduced the grand
jury access bill in 1979, introduced a new bill requiring a district court
to hold a grand jury investigation whenever an arrestee dies in police
custody.352 In the wake of the Kellin case publicity, the bill passed
the legislature by a vote of forty-two to zero.53
Nebraska's right to petition for a grand jury-when combined
with the statutory right to apply to the grand jury, the prosecutor, and
the court for the opportunity to appear and testify before the grand
jury-is a potentially powerful weapon in the hands of whistleblowers
and police brutality victims.
C. West Virginia: Allowing Access to the Grand Jury Through the
Impaneling Judge as a Constitutional Right
West Virginia has adopted the unique and salubrious position
that citizen access to the grand jury is a state constitutional right.
That West Virginia would recognize such a right follows naturally
from the state's fiercely independent heritage, which is embodied in
its state constitution. For example, the West Virginia Constitution
mandates that "[t]he right of the people ... to instruct their
representatives, or to apply for redress of grievances shall be held
inviolate." 5 4 Other sections of the Constitution discuss the domi-
nant role of the people over the government, 55 including the
"indefeasible" right of the people to "reform, alter or abolish" the
government should it prove to work contrary to the wishes of the
351. Grand Juiy Seeks No Indictments, UPI, Mar. 9, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
352. Regional News, Nebraska, UPI, Feb. 5, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
353. Id. Just days after it went into effect, the new law required an investigation of a
death by hanging of a suspect in police custody. Regional News, Nebraska, UPI, July 14,
1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Despite the advancement in
protection against brutality resulting from Kellin's death, however, the police officers were
neither indicted nor held liable in the subsequent civil suit. Agreement Reached in Negligence
Lawsuit Against City, UPI, June 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
354. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
355. Id. art. III, § 2 ("All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.
Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them."); see also
id. art. II, § 2 ("The powers of government reside in all the citizens of the State, and can
be rightfully exercised only in accordance with their will and appointment.").
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populace.5 6
The interpretation of the West Virginia Constitution as providing
a constitutional right of public access to the grand jury also reflects
the fierce independence of West Virginians. Article III, section 17
requires that the State courts "be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay." 57  Similarly, Article IX, section 4
retains popular sovereignty with respect to governmental officers, who
may be removed from office if convicted of "malfeasance, misfeasance,
or neglect of official duty."35  West Virginia courts have found
within these passages the guarantee of a right of citizen access to
grand juries.
Acknowledging that the prosecutor has strong influence over the
grand jury,3 59 the state judiciary has shown sympathy for the right
of crime victims to ensure that the crime is punished."S The
leading West Virginia case delineating the state constitutional right of
citizen access to the grand jury is State ex rel. Miller v. Smith, 6' which
arose from an instance of alleged police brutality. The victim, Miller,
approached both the local magistrate and the local prosecuting
356. Id. art. III, § 3. "This section is reluctantly but nevertheless commonly held by
political scientists and constitutional lawyers as a reservation of the right of revolution
under certain circumstances to the sovereign people." Shobe v. Latimer, 253 S.E.2d 54,
61 n.7 (W. Va. 1979).
357. Id. art. III, § 17.
358. Id. art. IX, § 4.
359. See, e.g., Kerns v. Wolverton, 381 S.E.2d 258 (W. Va. 1989). The Kerns court, noting
that both legal and popular culture reflect this prosecutorial influence, invoked literary
precedent, quoting Tom Wolfe's description of grand juries in his novel, The Bonfire of the
Vanities.
Grand-jury hearings had become a show run by the prosecutor. With rare
exceptions, a grand jury did whatever a prosecutor indicated he wanted them to
do. Ninety-nine percent of the time he wanted them to indict the defendant,
and they obliged without a blink. They were generally law-and-order folk anyway.
They were chosen from long-time residents of the community. Every now and
then, when political considerations demanded it, a prosecutor wanted to have a
charge thrown out. No problem; he merely had to couch his presentation in a
certain way, give a few verbal winks, as it were, and the grand jury would catch
on immediately. But mainly you used the grand jury to indict people, and in the
famous phrase of Sol Wachtler, chiefjudge of the State Court of Appeals, a grand
jury would "indict a ham sandwich," if that's what you wanted.
Id. at 262 n.4.
360. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Naum, 318 S.E.2d 454, 456 (W. Va. 1984) ("When
the legislature has created a crime, right or entitlement, citizens are entitled to executive
enforcement and implementation of that legislative dictate.").
361. 285 S.E.2d 500 (W. Va. 1981) (stating that the victim claimed to have been
assaulted with mace by two officers).
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attorney and submitted evidence of the alleged assault.3 62  Both
ultimately declined to pursue the case. 63 Then, consistent with the
vaguely extra-legal strategies that pervade the nation's lower criminal
courts, Miller told the prosecutor that on the day the grand jury was
scheduled to convene, Miller would appear and petition the foreman
of the grand jury for permission to submit evidence of the assault.
Responding in kind, the prosecutor said that he would use all the
powers of his office to prevent Miller from appearing before any
grand jury to press his complaint." 4 When Miller, along with a
witness, arrived at the courthouse on the day the grand jury was
scheduled to meet, the prosecutor told him that he would tell the
grand jury that Miller was there and wished to testify before them
about an alleged crime, but that he intended to use all his persuasive
powers to attempt to discourage the grand jurors from receiving
Miller or considering his case. 65 Mirabile dictu, the grand jury
subsequently voted to reject Miller's petition.366 Rising above the
usual hand-to-hand of the criminal courts, Miller then brought an
action for a writ of prohibition against the prosecutor.
67
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that Miller's
case raised issues going to "the fundamental nature and purpose of
the grand jury in our system of justice.""~ Noting that West
Virginia's state constitution requires that the grand jury remain both
a sword and a shield and not merely the prosecutor's puppet, 69 the
court held that a citizen whose rights have been violated is constitu-
tionally entitled to seek justice in the courts.7: In fact, the court
found that it is incumbent upon the circuit courts to ensure that any
citizen may bring his complaint before the grand jury.3 7' The court
stated that
[t]o fulfill its functions of protecting individual citizens and
providing them with a forum for bringing complaints within
the criminal justice system, the grand jury must be open to
the public for the independent presentation of evidence
362. Id. at 501-02.
363. Id.





369. Id. at 504 (construingW. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17, and stating that the prosecutor's
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before it. If the grand jury is available only to the prosecut-
ing attorney and all complaints must pass through him, the
grand jury can justifiably be described as a prosecutorial
tool. 372
As the court explained, such openness was necessary: (1) to prevent
abuse; (2) to keep the grand jury "free from all outside interference
and prosecutorial control"; and (3) because only the vigilance of the
courts can maintain that kind of independence. 37' Thus, the court
held, "by application to the circuit judge, whose duty is to insure
access to the grand jury, any person may go to the grand jury to
present a complaint to it."374
The court further held that it was improper for a grand jury to
hear any unsworn testimony from anyone, including the prosecu-
tor, 75 and that engaging in such conduct would vitiate an indict-
ment. 76 Thus, in West Virginia, a prosecutor may appear before
the grand jury for only two reasons: to present evidence through
sworn witnesses, and to give court-supervised instructions to thejurors;
the prosecutor specifically may not attempt to influence the grand
jury's decision. 77
In Miller, the court was unable to determine whether the
prosecutor had presented unsworn testimony.3 78 The court never-
theless pointed out that conduct such as that displayed by the
prosecutor could not be tolerated because it "threaten[ed] the
integrity of the grand jury's judicial function and constitute [d] an
ethical violation of standards of acceptable prosecutorial behav-
ior.,3 79 Furthermore, the Miller court concluded that issuing a writ
of prohibition was appropriate in such a case because the prosecutor
was attempting to usurp the supervisory powers of the court and the
judicial powers of the grand jury itself. 8 As for the former, the
court explained that prohibiting the prosecutor from interfering with
the court's supervision was necessary because otherwise the prosecutor
could undermine the court's role in "insur[ing] the fairness of grand
jury proceedings."" 8  As for the latter, because grand jurors must
372. Id.




377. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 7-4-1 (Repl. Vol. 1976)).
378. Id. at 505.
379. Id.
380. Id at 506.
381. Id.
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"diligently inquire and true presentment make of all such matters as
may be given [them] in charge or come to [their] knowledge," 82
a prosecutor who attempts to dissuade the jury from considering the
matter fully is interfering with the basic duty of the grand jury.3 13
Any effort by a prosecutor to persuade the grand jury not to hear a
matter is ultra vires and, the court held, might rise to the level of
obstruction of justice. 84
In sum, West Virginia courts have found that the citizens of West
Virginia have a constitutional right to appear before a grand jury.
The court's supervisory role in the process ensures that the prosecuto-
rial presentation is fair. Moreover, because grand jury proceedings
are recorded, 85 even if the court does not discover that the prose-
cutor is denigrating a citizen's complaint until after the grand jury has
382. Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 52-2-5 (1981)).
383. Id. at 506.
384. Id. In granting the requested writ of prohibition, the court summarized its ruling:
[A]n individual citizen-complainant has a constitutional right to appear before
a grand jury to present evidence of an alleged offense. A prosecuting attorney
may not render unsworn testimonial evidence before the grandjury. Prohibition
will lie against a prosecuting attorney who attempts to usurp the judicial function
of the circuit court and of the grand jury by attempting to discourage it from
hearing the independent presentation of evidence by a citizen complainant.
Id. at 507.
Other cases have followed Milleds holding. For example, in Cogar v. Strickler, 570
F. Supp. 34 (S.D. W. Va. 1983), plaintiff had applied to the local circuit court judge for
permission to present evidence to the grand jury that two individuals had attempted to
murder him. When the judge denied him permission, plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against the state judge in federal court. The federal court agreed that Miller v.
Smith entitled the plaintiff to appear before a grand jury but found the doctrine ofjudicial
immunity dispositive. Id. at 35-36. The court in State v. Pickens, 395 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va.
1990), set aside a conviction and declared the underlying indictment a nullity because the
prosecution, after learning that the grand jury was only willing to return a true bill for a
misdemeanor, but not for a felony charge, coerced the grandjury into reconsidering partly
because of the inconvenience of redrafting the indictment. Id, at 507-08. Immediately
thereafter, the grand jury agreed to the prosecutor's request and returned a felony
indictment. Id. at 508. The court held that the prosecutor had "exceeded his lawful
jurisdiction and usurped the judicial power of the court and the grand jury .... " Id, at
509. As a result, the indictment was defective and the conviction had to be set aside. Id.
Similarly, in State ex reL Starr v. Halbritter, 395 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va. 1990), the court
set aside the indictment because the prosecutor had drafted the actual indictment after the
grand jury returned its completed memoranda and forms. Id. at 774. In addition, the
prosecutor included in the indictment additional counts of which the jurors were unaware.
Id. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that both the court and the prosecutor are
without power to add to or alter an indictment returned by the grand jury. Id at 776.
"The failure of the grand jury as a body to vote upon the text of the indictment is a
fundamental error so compromising the integrity of the grand jury proceedings as to
constitute prejudice per se, and the indictment must be dismissed as void.. . ." Id. at 778-
79.
385. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
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voted no true bill, the case may be returned to that grand jury or sent
to another one.386 Although this tremendous power may result in
grand jury investigations of some frivolous claims,8 7 it also makes
it equally likely that fewer complainants who have meritorious
criminal charges to bring will be denied their day in court. West
Virginia's solution to the grand jury access problem, finding a right
of access in its state constitution, is a salutary and groundbreaking
resolution. It is probably just a matter of time, however, before other
states, interpreting their own constitutions, follow suit.
D. States Allowing Direct Access to the Grand Jury at the Judge's
Discretion
At least three states give judges discretionary authority to rule on
citizens' applications to appear before the grand jury: North
Carolina, Illinois, and Maine.
1. North Carolina.-In 1883, in United States v. Kilpatrick,3a a
federal district court concluded that the common law of North
Carolina gave citizens no right to contact the grand jury directly.389
If a citizen fell victim to a crime, he could either attempt to persuade
the prosecutor to proceed with his case or make a sworn complaint
before a committing magistrate, obtain an arrest warrant, and attend
a preliminary hearing on the allegations."90 A citizen could not
approach the grand jury directly; to do so constituted contempt and
was punishable as a misdemeanor.3 91
Today, however, a citizen can apply directly to a judge for
permission to appear before the grand jury. This change is a result
of the North Carolina General Assembly's efforts to recodify its code
of criminal procedure. 392  Under the revised code, the grand jury
remains an arm of the court.393 Surprisingly, the district attorney's
386. W. VA. CODE § 52-2-9 (1981) ("Although a bill of indictment be returned not a
true bill, another bill of indictment against the same person for the same offense may be
sent to and acted on by the same or another grand jury.").
387. E.g., Powers v. Goodwin, 291 S.E.2d 466,473 (W. Va. 1982) (observing that because
a citizen may appear before a grand jury whether or not the prosecutor wishes to seek an
indictment, "there are fewer impediments to frivolous criminal prosecutions than there
are perhaps elsewhere.").
388. 16 F. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883).
389. Id. at 769.
390. Id
391. Id
392. MATERIALS ON NORTH CAROLINA'S CODE OF PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I
(Douglas Gill ed.,June 1975).
393. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-621 (1973) (official commentary).
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role has been significantly limited. For instance, the prosecutor is not
permitted to examine witnesses before the grand jury.394 The judge,
not the prosecutor, is the legal advisor to the grand jury.39
Section 15A-626 of the code lists the parties who have the
authority to call witnesses before the grand jury and the exclusive
method by which one may apply to be a witness in a grand jury
proceeding. In the case of bills of indictment, the district attorney
lists on the bill the witnesses that he wants called; the clerk must call
those witnesses.396 If the grand jury wishes to hear testimony from
witnesses not listed on the bill, the foreman must request the
prosecutor to list and call those persons.397 Whether those persons
are called, however, is entirely within the discretion of the prosecu-
tor.398  "Any person not called as a witness who desires to testi-
fy"-such as a crime victim or a witness-"must apply to the district
attorney or to a superior court judge. The judge or the district
attorney in his discretion may call the witness to appear before the
grand jury."399
Because judges do not work as closely with police officers as
prosecutors do, there is, arguably, a greater chance that a judge will
permit a witness to, or victim of, police brutality to appear before the
grand jury. Indeed, the fact that the state constitution provides that
"[a] 11 courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor,
denial, or delay," " suggests that the judge should err on the side
of favoring the applicant. And since the grand jury is part of the
court,40 1 the court is its legal advisor,4 2 and the district attorney
394. Id. The official commentary reads: "The Commission debated the idea of allowing
the solicitor in the grand jury room to examine witnesses at least when investigations were
being undertaken. It finally decided in all cases to preserve the present arrangement
whereby all questioning is by the jurors-and unrecorded." Id.
395. Id. § 15A-624.
396. Id. § 15A-626(b).
397. Id.
398. Id. The exception to this rule is that members of the grand jury itself may testify.
Id § 15A-626(c).
399. Id. § 15-626(d). Despite these limitations, the grand jury does have some
independent investigatory authority. For example, § 15A-628(a) (4) of the code provides
the grand jury with the power to conduct an investigation on a matter not brought to its
attention by the prosecutor.
400. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; cf. supra notes 357 and 368-374 and accompanying text
(discussing a nearly identical provision in West Virginia's constitution, which forms the
primary basis of a judicially-recognized constitutional right of direct access to the grand
jury).
401. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
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is not ordinarily allowed in the grand jury,41 3 it should not be
difficult for the court to achieve a grand jury presentation which is
fair to the victim.
2. Illinois.-The state of Illinois strictly forbids direct citizen
access to members of the grand jury.4°4  Illinois has a long and
active history of opposition to direct access to grand jurors, beginning
in 1940 with People v. Parker.°5 In Parker I, Harrison Parker had
been found guilty of contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail for
sending two letters to the Cook County grand jury."6 The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the contempt verdict, ruling that any direct
communication with grand jurors constitutes contempt of court.4°7
Nevertheless, the court's reasoning was expressed in terms that imply
that a finding of contempt was proper only when the malicious nature
of the language in the letters "could serve no useful purpose ...
[and] [r]ather... expose[d] the grand jury to the danger of being
misled and abused by one motivated by personal animosity."40 8
402. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
404. Inexplicably, Illinois has had far more than its fair share of litigation on this issue,
including grand jury communicants who were lawyers, former judges, and recidivists. See
infra notes 405-426 and accompanying text.
405. 30 N.E.2d 11 (111. 1940) [hereinafter Parker 1].
406. Id. at 12. The letters alleged that McCormick, the President of the Chicago
Tribune, and the State's Attorney had conspired to commit tax evasion. Id. Furthermore,
he alleged that the two had manipulated the courts, resulting in huge losses to the
taxpayers, and that McCormick had secured the imprisonment of two innocent men. Id.
He also claimed that McCormick had cheated the state out of inheritance tax. Id
407. Id. at 14.
408. Id. The letters were "couched in exceedingly vicious and inflammatory language."
Id. at 12. The court's statement in People v. Doss, 46 N.E.2d 984 (Il. 1943), lent greater
support to the theory that it was not communication with the grand jury per se which was
prohibited, but communication pervaded by personal attack and vitriol:
It is now definitely settled in Illinois that written communications to members of
a grand jury while in session, containing malicious accusations against private
citizens, and public officials, including the State's Attorney, and couched in such
language that they can serve no useful purpose but show only personal enmity, constitute
contempt of court as an unauthorized interference with the administration of
justice ....
Id. at 988 (emphasis added).
Such reasoning fails to withstand scrutiny. Direct communications with the grandjury
are assumed by the Parker I court to be the result of self-interest and personal enmity,
unworthy of grand jury consideration. The court's reasoning creates an irrebuttable
presumption that public corruption cases either are not real cases or can be prosecuted
some other way. The court also assumes that neither grand jurors nor the supervising
judge (on a motion to dismiss) are capable of weeding out cases motivated by personal
enmity. In reality, shouldn't vitriolic and intemperate language diminish the credibility of
the letter writer? Contrast this situation to indictments brought by improperly motivated
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The court clarified its position seven years later, when Mr. Parker
was in court again facing similar contempt allegations. 4°9 This time,
Parker's letter to the foreman of the grand jury was free of all "vicious
and inflammatory language. 410  In upholding his sentence for
criminal contempt, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that the
absence of vituperative language was not determinative .41 Based on
Parker I and Parker II, therefore, it is quite clear that, no matter what
language employed, one may not communicate directly with an
Illinois grand jury.
Illinois, however, does permit access to the grand jury through
the impaneling judge. The leading case, People v. Sears,412 was the
result of a police raid on the Chicago headquarters of the Black
Panthers. Two members of the Black Panther Party were killed by the
Chicago police during that raid,413 and certain individuals and
organizations petitioned the state circuit court to impanel a grand
jury to investigate. 4  Circuit Judge Power granted the petition and
appointed a special prosecutor, Barnabas Sears. 5
After investigating for nearly five months, the grand jury voted to
indict the State's Attorney and twelve Chicago police officers.416
The next day, before the vote had been made public, Judge Power
summoned Sears, his staff, and the grand jury members for a
conference.4 17 Judge Power directed the grand jury to hear addi-
tional testimony from specified witnesses. 8 Judge Power then
directed Sears to call every witness who had testified before the
federal grand jury convened to investigate the incident; when Sears
refused, Power held him in contempt.419  Subsequently, at the
professional prosecutors; is it not the purpose of the grand jury to protect putative
defendants from the state? If it serves that function, why cannot it protect them from a
private citizen who lacks all the impressive accoutrements of the district attorney?
409. People v. Parker, 74 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. 1947), aff'd, 334 U.S. 816 (1948) [hereinafter
Parker I1].
410. Id. at 525.
411. Id.
412. 273 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. 1971).
413. James P. Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency
of the Prosecutor?, 2 N.M. L. REV. 141 (1972).
414. See Sears, 273 N.E.2d at 382.
415. Id. The State's Attorney was one of those whose conduct was to be investigated.
Id
416. See Shannon, supra note 413, at 149.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. People v. Sears, 273 N.E.2d 380, 383 (Ill. 1971).
Angry, red-faced and frequently pounding the table, Judge Power excoriated
Sears in open court for not calling the additional witnesses before the grand jury.
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request of some grand jurors and over the objection of Sears, Judge
Power and a court reporter met with the individual members of the
grand jury.420
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed Judge Power's order
holding Sears in contempt of court for refusing to subpoena the
witnesses as ordered, ruling that the facts of the case did not warrant
judicial interference with the grand jury's independence. 42  Al-
though the court acknowledged that the Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure provided that "[t] he Grand Jury shall hear all evidence
presented by the State's Attorney,"4 22 the court concluded that the
judge may order the grand jury to hear certain additional evidence
under appropriate circumstances.42 The Illinois Supreme Court
found that thejudiciary's authority in this regard stems primarily from
its relationship with the grand jury: in essence, the grand jury is an
"arm of the court." '42 4 As such, the court necessarily retains supervi-
sory power over the grand jury in order to ensure that the grand jury
assists in the process of fairly administering justice and enforcing the
law.425 Furthermore, "It]he exercise of the power necessary to
discharge this 'particular responsibility' does not require a claim of
abuse of process of one who has standing to make it, for the court has
inherent power to supervise the grand jury so as to prevent the
perversion of its process."426
Indeed, in the exercise of its inherent power of supervision over
the grand jury, the circuit court may order that the minutes of the
grand jury proceedings be submitted to it for inspection.42 7 To
"I now order you to subpoena all witnesses," he said. "I don't care who they are.
I want them all to appear. Are you going to do that?"
Sears replied . . . "I cannot submit to your direction. You honestly
believe you have the power you are seeking to exercise. You have absolutely no
such power at all. It would impeach the integrity of the grand jury. . . . I would
be in violation of my oath (as special prosecutor) if I were to submit to the order
and domination of your honor, and I therefore refuse."
Shannon, supra note 413, at 150 (quoting Chicago newspapers' descriptions of the
proceedings).
420. Sears, 273 N.E.2d at 385.
421. Id. at 389.
422. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 112, para. 4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1969).
423. Sears, 273 N.E.2d at 389 (permitting such a judicial order to hear evidence "only
when failure to do so will effect a deprivation of due process or result in a miscarriage of
justice").
424. Id. at 391 (citing People v. lanniello, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443 (N.Y. 1968)).
425. Id at 387 (quoting People v. McCauley, 100 N.E. 182, 184 (Il. 1912)).





prevent "injustice and abuse of process," the court may even act prior
to indictment.42 In sum, although it is clearly illegal in Illinois to
contact a grand juror directly, an aggrieved citizen may petition the
impaneling judge for a hearing by the grand jury, and the judge has
the power to ensure that the citizen will be heard by the grand jury
in a fair presentation.
3. Maine.-In Maine, a crime victim or witness whose case is
rejected by the prosecutor may apply to a Superior Court judge for
permission to present evidence directly to a grand jury. The
pertinent Maine statute reads:
Grand juries shall present all offenses cognizable by the
court at which they attend . . . . Evidence relating to
offenses cognizable by the court may be offered to the grand
jury by the Attorney General, the district attorney, the
assistant district attorney and, at the discretion of the
presiding justice, by such other persons as said presiding
justice may permit."
Research has disclosed only one case discussing this statute, In re
Thomas,430 which involved a citizen's petition to a Superior Court
judge requesting permission to present evidence of "Official Oppres-
sion" before the grand jury.431 The parties agreed that state com-
mon law had permitted unrestricted citizen access to the grand jury
until 1953, when the statute was passed restricting access to grand
juries except through the judge.4"2 The question to be resolved was
whether Thomas had a right of access under the statute. 43' Thomas
maintained that the statute merely codified common law and that the
language concerning the presiding justice was injected merely to
clarify how a citizen might achieve his goal, but not to establish an
exclusive way to proceed.4"4 The court disagreed:
428. Id.; see also People v. Melson, 363 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1977) ("Sears stands for the
proposition that a court may act prior to indictment to prevent injustice and abuse of
process.").
429. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1256 (West 1993).
430. 434 A.2d 503 (Me. 1981).
431. Id. at 504. The alleged oppression was caused by the Portland police chief's refusal
to issue Thomas a permit for a concealed weapon. I& Thomas already had presented his
case to an assistant district attorney and an assistant attorney general. Id. at 505. Both had
declined to prosecute the Police Chief on the grounds that they felt they would be unable
to prove the mens rea element of the offense. Id.
432. Id. at 506-07.
433. Id. at 507.
434. Id.
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In our judgment, the enacted version represents a legislative
compromise between unrestricted citizen access to the grand
jury and no citizen access at all. If the Legislature had
intended a different result, it would not in plain words have
conditioned the presentation of evidence to grand jurors on
the prior permission of the presiding justice. Whatever the
citizen's rights immediately before the passage of Section
1256 may have been, he can today go before the grand jury
as a volunteer witness, if, but only if, he has first obtained
the court's permission.
The court then exercised its discretion and denied Thomas's
petition.46 The court indicated that the standard of discretion for
courts to exercise includes the three basic criteria described in
Section 1256. First, the applicant must have "personal knowledge" of
the offense.437 Second, "the petition on its face [must] allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate ... at least a substantial possibility, that
the grand jury will be persuaded to indict."43 8  Finally, the judge
must "be satisfied that the public interest will be served by allowing
the petitioner to present his case to the grand jury."43 9  Thomas did
not meet these criteria.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court explained the third criterion
in terms of considerations similar to those the prosecutor would
consider, including doubt as to the accused's actual guilt or the
victim's actual harm suffered, the disproportionate amount of
punishment in relation to the offense or the offender, and any
improper motives of the applicant." ° As a practical matter, a court
would consider significant the fact that the prosecutors who were
approached rejected the allegations."' This final consideration
435. Id.
436. Id at 505. The trial court indicated that the usual situation in which a private
citizen would be appointed to offer evidence before a grand jury is where the prosecutor
has a conflict of interest. Id at 507-08.
437. Id. at 508. The court may have read this requirement into Section 1256.
Previously the court had held that a grand jury may indict on evidence that would not be
admissible at trial. See State v. St. Clair, 418 A.2d 184, 186 n.2 (Me. 1980).
438. In re Thomas, 434 A.2d at 508. Although this standard is not overly precise and
undoubtedly is applied differently by differentjudges, the language "substantial possibility"
sets a fairly low threshold. Mr. Thomas, however, had an extremely weak case. See id
439. Id.
440. Id. at 508-09 (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 n.15 (1977) (in
turn quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 3.9(b) (1971)).
441. The court expressed its instinctive urge to defer to the prosecutor's discretion:
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
probably should not be decisively significant, however, because in
reviewing a petition the judge is supposed "to stand in the shoes of
the prosecutor. "442 Thus, the standard for review by the court
should not be one of error, but rather a de novo review.
443
E. Other States: Common or Uncommon Law?
Whether citizens can gain access to the grand jury in all remain-
ing jurisdictions depends wholly upon whether the state has altered
the common law rules concerning grand juries. Early American
colonists integrated the English grand jury system into their new
judicial systems. 444 After the American Revolution, both the state
and federal governments retained the grand jury as an essential part
of their criminal justice systems." 5 As the frontier moved West, new
territories incorporated the grand jury into their justice systems as
well.446
The earliest English grand juries brought accusations based on
the personal knowledge of the jurors themselves. 447  Gradually,
grand juries began to consider accusations made known to them by
the crown prosecutors and outsiders as well. 448  The American
common law grand juries owe much of their independence to these
early English juries; their influence is most evident in the great
popularity in the American colonies of English writings on the
Where, as here, both an assistant attorney general and an assistant district
attorney have already chosen not to go to the grand jury, where the record
establishes no prejudice underlying their decisions, and where, under 15 M.R.S.A.
§ 1256, ajustice of the Superior Court is subsequently asked to stand in the shoes
of the prosecutor, considerations such as the above necessarily come into play.
Id. at 509.
442. Id.
443. Because evidence may be hard to obtain, the de novo review is of practical value as
well. It is important to note that recording of grand jury proceedings in Maine is
discretionary. ME. R. CRIM. PROC. 6(d); see, e.g., State v. Rich, 395 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me.
1978) (noting that "[t]ranscription of the testimony presented to the grand jury is made
permissive, not mandatory."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 854 (1979); accord, State v. Huff, 469
A.2d 1251, 1254 (Me. 1984) ("In its discretion for good cause shown, the court is
authorized to order that a court reporter record the evidence presented to the grand
jury."); State v. Levesque, 281 A.2d 570 (Me. 1970) (holding that this rule violates no equal
protection standard). Therefore, undertaking any review other than a de novo review may
be quite difficult.
444. Robert G. Johnston, The Grand Jurt-y-Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 157, 158 (1974).
445. Id.
446. Id. at 159.
447. See, e.g., YOUNGER, supra note 98, at 11 & n.12 (describing the sources of
accusations for grand jurors in colonial Virginia).
448. Id. at I n.1.
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subject.449 One pamphlet of particular importance in America was
written by the Lord Chancellor of England, John Somer, entitled The
Security of Englishmen's Lives or the Trust, Power and Duty of Grand
Juries.450 Somer's work interpreted the powers of the grand jury
quite broadly and stressed that grand juries were not limited to
investigating only matters brought to their attention by the court, but
rather could inquire into all matters that came to their attention.45 '
In England most of the accusations came from the established
constabulary; since the colonies had no such established police forces,
the grand jury was much more independent in determining whom to
accuse.452 Grand juries in colonial Virginia considered not only the
matters given them by the judges and the legislature but also
presented matters on their own initiative.453
From the inception of American grand juries, there were two
competing views of the scope of the grand jury's powers and
responsibilities. The majority view was that grand juries were almost
wholly unrestricted; the minority view was that grand juries were
purely reactive, not proactive.454 The minority view, which was
followed primarily in Tennessee and Pennsylvania,455 had its share
of prominent intellectuals vocally demonstrating their support.
United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, in an 1832 article
for the Encyclopedia Americana, depicted the grand jury as acting only
at the behest of the government. Story omitted any reference to the
possibility of grand jurors starting their own inquiries or conducting
themselves independently of the court.456 Professor Francis Whar-
ton described such limited access to the grand jury as "the view which
may now be considered as accepted in the United States courts and
in most of the several states."457
449. Id. at 21-22.
450. Id. at 21.
451. Id at 21 & n.29. Other influential texts include Sir John Hawles' The Englishman's
Rights, and Henry Care's English Liberties or Free Born Subjects. Id. at 21-22. Care's work is
notable for his recognition of the importance of sheltering the grand jury from judicial
interference. Id. at 21.
452. Id. at 5.
453. Id. at 11 & n.12.
454. See generally id. at 5-26.
455. See id. at 63-64. Tennessee has since provided for citizen access to the grand jury.
See supra notes 291-292, 294, 303 and accompanying text.
456. Id. at 62 (citing 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA AMERICANA 284 (Francis Lieber ed., 1832)).
457. YOUNGER, supra note 98, at 141-42 (quoting FRANCIs WHARTON, CRIMINAL PRACTICE
AND PLEADING 227-35 (9th ed. 1889)). In support of this proposition, however, Wharton
cited only the federal courts and Pennsylvania and Tennessee decisions-the only states
that observed such a rule. Id. at 142.
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Naturally, the majority view was not without its own vocal
proponents. 4 58 The United States Supreme Court, in Frisbie v. United
States,459 ruled that grand juries in America could inquire into any
crime, "no matter how or by whom suggested to them."' Many
states were not far behind in ruling similarly, also having adopted the
common law. 46' For example, in 1891, Maryland's Court of Appeals
held that regardless of how the underlying facts originally came to
their attention, the grand jury could proceed to investigate.462 The
New York Court of Appeals held that, in America, grand juries have
also been
clothed by the common law with inquisitorial powers and, of
their own motion, may make full investigation to see
whether a crime has been committed, and, if so, who
committed it. They may investigate on their own knowledge,
or upon information of any kind derived from any source
deemed reliable, may swear witnesses generally, and may
originate charges against those believed to have violated the
criminal laws.
The grand jury system is part of our common law.464 States are
not mandated by the federal "due process" clause to provide grand
juries,4" but some state constitutions have provisions to the effect
that no one shall be held to answer for felonies or other infamous
crimes except on presentment or indictment by a grand jury. In
those states, such provisions are deemed to refer to the common law
grand jury, providing the same protections as at common law,
through a grand jury that was traditional at common law, functioning
458. It at 60-61, 142.
459. 157 U.S. 160 (1895).
460. Id. at 163. Justice James Wilson had espoused the view that the grand jury's area
of inquiry knew no bounds as early as 1790. YOUNGER, supra note 98, at 60.
461. See, e.g., Fitts v. Superior Court, 57 P.2d 510, 515 (Cal. 1936); accord In re Opinion
to the Governor, 4 A.2d 487 (R.I. 1939); see also People ex reL Ferrill v. Graydon, 164 N.E.
832, 834 (Ill. 1928) (observing that the common law powers and duties attach to offices
that existed at common law and that are adopted into the state constitution).
462. Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21 A. 547 (1891). A half century later, the Maryland
Court of Appeals said: "The broad common law inquisitorial powers of the grand jury
never have been curtailed by statute in this state but have been reaffirmed as set out in the
opinion in this case." Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 96, 40 A.2d 319, 324 (1944).
463. People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 79 N.E. 330, 333 (N.Y. 1906).
464. Fitts, 57 P.2d at 515 ("The common law was adopted in this state at the meeting
of its first Legislature. ... The grand jury system is a product of the common law."); see
also People v. Graydon, 164 N.E. 832, 834 (Ill. 1929).
465. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 534, 538 (1884).
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generally as it did at common law.41 "Where the Legislature has
created an office which was known to the common law, and by virtue
of the common law was vested with certain powers and duties, those
common-law powers and duties attached to the office by reason of its
adoption by the Constitution."46 7
States have explicitly provided in their state constitutions that the
common law remains in effect except where it is expressly changed by
statute.468 Other states, by general statute, have adopted the com-
mon law of England, usually as of 1776, unless changed by the legisla-
ture.469  Still others have incorporated and reincorporated general
principles or institutions of the common law into their constitutions
and legislation without express declaration.47 °
Therefore, the only way for a state's grand jury to function
differently than it did at common law is for the state legislature to
have adopted express changes. "The courts of general jurisdiction of
North Carolina, including the Superior Court, unless specifically
denied them by statute, retain the powers inherent in them at
common law."'471 "Such power [to declare a change of venue in a
criminal trial] existed at common law, and, therefore, unless
specifically denied by statute, still adheres in the courts of the
country. '47' As the Rhode Island Supreme Court observed,
[W]e have found no instance, under our charter form of
government before the adoption of our constitution or in
this state since the adoption of our constitution, where the
legislative branch of our government ever attempted to
exercise power to make any substantial changes in the
466. Fitts, 57 P.2d at 514-16; In re Opinion to the Governor, 4 A.2d 487 (R.I. 1939); see
also 38 C.J.S. GrandJuries § 1(c) (1943); 38 AM. JUR. 2D GrandJury § 2 (1968).
467. Graydon, 164 N.E. at 834.
468. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13; see also W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1994); State v. Gory, 93
S.E.2d 494, 499 (W. Va. 1956) (noting that state statutes had modified the common law
rules regarding grand juries).
469. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-211 (West 1986).
470.
Neither the Illinois Constitution nor the legislature has attempted to define the
powers of the grand jury. It has its origin in the common law and has existed for
many hundreds of years. Its construction, organization,jurisdiction, and method
of proceeding were all well known features of the common law before the
organization of the State of Illinois and have been recognized and adopted in all
our constitutions and in legislation as it existed at the organization of the State.
People v. Polk, 174 N.E.2d 393, 395 (11. 1961).
471. In re Superior Court Order, 318 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
English v. Brigman, 41 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 1947) (quoting Miller v. Miller, 172 S.E. 493, 494
(N.C. 1934) (Stacy, C.J., concurring))).
472. English, 41 S.E.2d at 732 (citations omitted).
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composition, purpose or prerogatives customarily associated
with and accorded to a grand jury under the common law.
Nor have we found any such instance in England prior to
the declaration of our state's independence on May 4,
1776.47
Therefore, unless a state has expressly changed the common law,
the common law right to approach grand jurors directly still applies.
And even if a state has prohibited direct access to the grand jury,
research has not revealed any state that prohibits applications to
testify before the grand jury that are directed to the impaneling judge
of the grand jury.
IV. RODNEY KING REVISITED: THE DOUBLE STANDARD CONTINUES
It may be argued that, in fairness, after their acquittal by a Simi
County jury on state charges, the four officers in the Rodney King
case were tried on federal civil rights charges; indeed, two were even
convicted. But the Rodney King case, accompanied as it was by a
videotape of the most horrifying examples of police brutality, was a
particularly strong case for the prosecution; in the eyes of the public,
it was a slam-dunk.
However, a careful analysis of the King case shows that this most
egregious of cases-a case about which people of color said, finally,
the police will have to be punished 474-actually confirms that we
have a dual system of justice, one for law enforcement officers and
another one for everyone else. The King case represents no victory
for equality before the law.
There were twenty-three LAPD officers on the scene of the King
beating but only one attempted to intervene. 7h Only four of the
twenty-two other officers were prosecuted in State court, and they
were all acquitted.476 After that acquittal, only the same four
officers were tried in federal court, and only two-Lawrence Powell
and Stacey Koon-were convicted.4" At sentencing, the two convict-
ed officers faced up to ten years in prison 478 and fines of up to
473. In re Opinion to the Governor, 4 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 1939).
474. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
476. See supra note 15.
477. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
478. Seth Mydans, Sympathetic Judge Gives Officers 2 1/2 Years in Rodney King Beating, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Mydans, Sympathetic Judge].
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$250,000.479
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution attempted to
introduce evidence of an aggravating factor: defendant Powell had
been severely reprimanded by the Los Angeles Police Department for
repeatedly hitting a prone, handcuffed prisoner with a flashlight just
five months before the Rodney King episode;... defendant Stacey
Koon was Powell's supervisor in this incident as he was in the Rodney
King episode, and Koon, too, had been reprimanded."' The
sentencing judge, United States District Court Judge John Davies,
ruled the prior incident irrelevant and refused to admit it into
evidence." Instead, Judge Davies gave each defendant a sentence
of two and one-half years in prison and waived all fines,"' explain-
ing that he was being lenient because their reactions had been "pro-
voked" by Mr. King,4 84 and the two defendants were fine police
officers and upstanding family men, labelling their plight "fraught
with sympathy."8 5 That Mr. King or any other nonlaw enforcement
officer who had done what the two convicted officers did could have
received a similar sentence is extraordinarily unlikely; and the idea
that Mr. King had "provoked" the officers in this situation was
ludicrous. In imposing this sentence, the judge himself admitted that
he had stretched the federal sentencing guidelines.486 Indeed,
Professor Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School, who had been an
observer at the trial, remarked of Judge Davies: "But I think in some
ways people felt as if he watched a trial that was different from the
trial that we were watching." 8 7
The majority of the jurors in the federal trial were disappointed
by the leniency of the sentence."' One juror scoffed at the idea of
King provoking the violence, 489 and another said he felt "betrayed"
by the lenient sentences.490 The New York Times, calling the justice
meted out in Los Angeles "tepid" and "insipid," made the important
point thatJudge Davies's sentence "sent an unfortunate message: that
479. Seth Mydans, Behind Beating Sentence: Guidelines and Sympathy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1993, at B6 [hereinafter Mydans, Guidelines].
480. Report Cites Prior Beating by Officer in King Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at A10.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. See Mydans, Sympathetic Judge, supra note 478, at Al.
484. See id.
485. Mydans, Guidelines, supra note 479, at B6.
486. Id.
487. Id.





a serious breach of the law by the people who are supposed to
enforce it will be treated leniently."49" '
While the Justice Department elected to appeal Judge Davies's
lenient sentence,492 the message sent by that sentence, that there is
a dual system of justice in our courts, was received by the entire
population. This perception is corroborated by the defendants'
treatment under our system of bail; unlike most people charged with
assault with deadly weapons, defendants Koon and Powell remained
free through two indictments and two trials.49 Their streak finally
broke when a federal appeals court denied bail to the two convicted
officers.49 4 Even after the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit declined to grant the officers bail pending appeal,
Judge Davies took the unusual step of allowing them to remain free
so that they could petition the United States Supreme Court to give
them bail.495 As one legal expert, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky,
explained: "It is very, very unusual for the Supreme Court ever to get
involved in bail questions, and therefore it is very unusual for a
district courtjudge to stay the reporting time pending the opportuni-
ty for an appeal to the Supreme Court." '496 Although the Supreme
Court ultimately turned down the officers' bail requests,497 there can
be little question from this record that both officers were afforded
special treatment throughout our bail system. A civilian defendant
would never have been treated this way.
Nevertheless, the Rodney King case subjected the Los Angeles
Police Department to such scrutiny-by the public, the Christopher
Commission, and the courts-that one might expect a fundamental
change in attitude or behavior from that organization. However, well
after the King affair, the LAPD refused to cooperate with county
prosecutors by supplying them with documents from an internal
investigation of the fatal shooting, by two white officers, of a black
woman.49 The woman had been shot nine times-seven times in
491. Tepid Justice in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 20.
492. U.S. Is Appealing Sentences in Rodney King's Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at 6.
493. Seth Mydans, Federal Appeals Court Denies Bail to Officers in Rodney King Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at A13.
494. Id.
495. Seth Mydans, Sentence Delayed for 2 in Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at A20.
496. Id.
497. Justices Turn Down Bail for One Officer in Rodney King Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993,
at A20; 2d Officer in King Case Loses Bid for Bai N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at B8.
498. Los Angeles Police Refuse to Aid in Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at 32.
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the back.4' Because the prosecution of Rodney King's abusers fell
far short of sending a clear message that assault by police officers will
be taken seriously and punished just as an assault by a civilian would
be, it appears that little has changed.
Recently, videotape played a crucial role in an assault case, this
time a labor arbitration in New York. Two prison guards were
videotaped beating a handcuffed prisoner, who was groaning in
pain.' ° The labor arbitrator upheld the firing of the two guards
responsible for the actual beating and reduced to suspensions the
punishments of two other guards who "merely" lied about the
incident to protect their friends."' Comparing the beating to the
Rodney King episode, the arbitrator said: "The two were fired
because it was an unprovoked, unjustified attack. The inmate didn't
do anything to deserve it. The force was unnecessary and excessive.
Horrible is the only way to describe what's on the tape. It's really
disgusting .... There was no justification for this whatsoever. "502
In announcing the results of the labor arbitration, a spokesman
for the State Department of Correctional Services "added that the
department has not decided whether to pursue criminal charges
against the two dismissed guards."" 3 Again the double standard,
again the hesitation to punish with penal sanctions acts by law
enforcement officers which constitute crimes and which, had they
been committed by civilians, most assuredly would have been
prosecuted.
There are no statistics to show us precisely how often law
enforcement officers assault citizens. However, the Justice Depart-
ment does keep records on how many of these cases they file each
year. In fiscal year 1992, the federal government filed criminal
charges in 27 of these cases; in 1991, 36 cases; in 1990, 23 cases.50 4
499. Id. ("Five officers have already testified before the grand jury, The [Los Angeles]
Times said. The officers and other witnesses were questioned about how seven bullets had
hit Ms. Taylor in the back.").
500. Ian Fisher, Filmed Beating of Inmate Leads to Dismissal of 2 Prison Guards, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1994, at BI.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id. Shortly thereafter, the F.B.I., having received a complaint from the beaten
inmate a month earlier, announced it was looking into the matter; and the local district
attorney, who said he did not know about the incident until the arbitrator's ruling,
indicated that he, too, would investigate the matter. F.B.I Looks at Inmate's Rights in Filmed
Beating by 2 Guards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at B8.
504. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, by Lorna Grenadier, Supervisory Paralegal Specialist, Criminal Section, to the
author (Aug. 18, 1993) (on file with author) (providing a "Summary [of] Criminal Section
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From 1982 through 1992, the minimum number of this category of
cases filed was 18; the maximum number was 42.505
From these numbers it is clear that the federal government is not
making the slightest dent in the problem of police brutality.
Therefore, the problem falls, of necessity, to the states. And if local
prosecutors will not take the lead, then citizens must act-through
their grand juries-to do away with this dual system of justice and
hold our law enforcers to the same standard of conduct as the average
citizen.
V. CONCLUSION
Gaining access to a grand jury-either directly or through the
impaneling judge-certainly would limit the prosecutor's total
monopoly and increase his or her accountability. Of equal impor-
tance, it would be a powerful weapon in the hands of citizens who are
now all too often shut out of the criminal courts.0 6 The crime
victim would have a far better chance of securing a criminal prosecu-
tion against his victimizer; the whistleblower would have a far better
chance of exposing public and private corruption. Battered women,
gays, lesbians, minorities, the homeless-society's most marginal and
most vulnerable-would be given a chance to tell their stories of
victimization to those who are not part of the professional law
enforcement system.
Most of all, however, giving citizens direct access to the grand
jury helps to ameliorate the problem of the symbiotic relationship
between police and public prosecutors. When plain, ordinary citizens
are able to approach the grand jury or the empaneling judge, it is
likely that far more indictments will issue against brutal police
officers-particularly in the less sensational cases.
Permitting citizens to exercise the right to approach the grand
jury directly, and ensuring that fairness results once citizens do appear
there, puts tremendous responsibility on the shoulders of the
judiciary. "The judiciary may be the last hope for salvaging the grand
jury from obsolescence. By vigorous use of its powers and discretion,
the judiciary could restore the grand jury to a position of indepen-
dence and usefulness."0 7 Although the courts retain this general
Activities").
505. Id.
506. "The advantage of citizen participation in an age when people feel increasingly
alienated from the legal system should not be lightly discarded." Coffey & Norman, supra
note 217, at 767.
507. Id. at 757 (quoting Johnston, supra note 444, at 157).
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authority and the responsibility for supervising the grand jury, the
degree of willingness to protect the independence of the grand jury
from prosecutorial domination obviously will vary from judge to
judge.
In fulfilling this protective role, the judge should seek to appoint
a strong foreperson, one who will not be easily intimidated by the
prosecutor. In the charge to the grand jury, instead of merely
delivering "platitudinous generalizations about the nature and
tradition of grand jury investigations," 08 the judge should make
clear to the jurors that they are completely independent from the
prosecutor. Not only do they have a right to refuse to vote a true bill
requested by the prosecutor, but they also have an affirmative duty to
investigate matters referred to them by the court.0 9 And in certain
jurisdictions, they have the same obligation to investigate matters
coming to their attention directly from members of the public. In
this way, police brutality-police criminality-can be recriminalized
in this country and the deterrent value of penal sanctions can begin
to work against this epidemic of police violence.
508. Id. at 758 (quoting Bruce H. Schneider, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, &
Problems, 9 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROB. 681, 703, n.129 (1973).
509. Johnston, supra note 444, at 758.
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